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ABSTRACT

RACE AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION:
BLACK VOTING PARTICIPATION AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Angela Stallings Hagan
April 8, 2009

Despite the fact that few large metropolitan areas have had city-county consolidations,
interest remains high in these mergers as a means of restructuring urban government.
Evaluation literature on city-county consolidations generally focuses on the criteria of efficiency
and efficacy, not equity. Economic growth, cost savings, and tax levels and service provision are
discussed more than the distribution of resources and power. There is a particular dearth of
literature on political equity as it pertains to racial minorities. This study attempts to fill that void
through the examination of black political participation levels prior to and following the four largescale city-county consolidations in the last century: Nashville-Davidson County; JacksonvilleDuval County; Indianapolis-Marion County; and Louisville-Jefferson County. A common
argument against consolidation is that it dilutes minority voting strength since urban minority
populations have historically been concentrated in central cities. It is posited that black voter
participation will decrease following consolidation due to a perception of loss of power. Further,
sub-hypotheses positing that participation will vary among black voters according to
socioeconomic status are explored. Mixed results are found in terms of turnout over time among
the cities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION/LITERATURE REVIEW

There has long been a debate over the structure of urban government In terms of the
manner in which metropolitan governments are organized, there are two major schools of
thought: polycentrism and consolidation. Polycentrism is associated with a "fragmented" form of
government, conSisting of many small units of government, whereas consolidation is concerned
with a small number of local governments.
The consolidationist movement started out in the early twentieth century as a "good
government" movement of sorts, determined to clean up corruption and reform local systems rife
with machine politics. Beginning in the 1960s, a high rate of government proliferation spurred by
suburban and special district growth added fuel to the consolidation movement, whose advocates
believed that a high number of governments was ineffective and inefficient (Savitch and Vogel
1996; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).
Adherents to the polycentric approach decry the use of terms like "fragmented" and
"crazy quilt" patterns of government, preferring the notion of local pLiblic economies in the form of
complex networks of governance. Public choice theorists such as Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren
(1961) and Parks and Oakerson (1989) argue for a market-based view irrwhich citizens "vote
with their feet" by choosing the area within the larger area that most closely matches their
taxation and service provision preferences, which in turn leads local governments to be more
efficient in order to remain competitive. Moreover, in

respons~

to criticisms that the lack of a

strong central metropolitan government leads to conflict which bars progress, Bish and Ostrom
(1973, p. 94) say that can be viewed as a positive factor because "[f]ragmentation of authority
does increase levels of visible conflict But visible conflict may bring out information. clarify
issues and encourage a search for mutually agreeable solution."
Since the beginning of the reform debate, few large metropolitan areas have undergone
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government consolidation in any form. The issue is typically decided by voters, although there
are exceptions, such as Indianapolis' consolidation with Marion County. The number of large
areas with successful city-county consolidation referenda can be counted on one hand: NashvilleDavidson County (1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County
(1969); and most recently, Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2000).1 Between the
Jacksonville and Louisville consolidations, there have been some medium and smaller citiesLexington-Fayette County, Kentucky (1972), Athens-Clarke County, Georgia (1990), and Kansas
City-Wyandotte County, Kansas (1997) for example--- that have merged with their counties. For
the most part, however, failures heavily outweigh successes in city-county consolidation efforts.
Since the 1947 consolidation in Baton Rouge, there have been fewer than 30 city-county mergers
in any size metropolitan area. 2
The low number of cases and uniqueness of each case contributes to a lack of
comparative studies, making generalizations difficult. Most consolidation has been in the form of
city-county mergers, and those are no more than a few dozen, including areas much smaller than
Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Evidence in support of
consolidation's beneficial effects, mostly based on cases of city-county merger, is often
inconclusive, with researchers acknowledging mixed results or often using associative evidence
in lieu of analysis based in quasi-experimental designs or other research with controls for various
factors that might affect outcomes (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Savitch and Vogel 1996; Stephens
. and Wikstrom 2000). Similarly, many arguments of the public choice school tend to be largely
theoretical without extensive empirical support, though some studies have shown negative results
such as increased taxes and costs or a decrease in services (Benton and Gamble 1983; Condrey
1994); Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).
Over the 30 years between the Indianapolis and Louisville mergers, debates about the
merits of "fragmented" versus consolidated governments continued, with scholars evaluating the

I Some, such as Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) might incI ude the 1947 consolidation of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana and its parish. However, it was not a city over 250,000, like Nashville, Jacksonville,
Indianapolis, or Louisville.
2 Condrey (1994) notes that there. were only 20 between 1947 and 1994. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000)
~ention Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte County, Kansas in the 1990s.
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limited number of cases available for study. The debate has never really been resolved (partially
due to the lack of cases for making generalizations), and the arguments remain much the same.

The New Regionalism
In contrast, however, urban socioeconomic realities have changed, and students of urban
government have shifted their focus to reflect today's urban condition. Population and job shifts
from cities to suburbs and exurbs have presented fiscal challenges for central cities that have lost
tax bases, and smaller governments outside of the cities may lack the resources to efficiently and
effectively provide key services to constituents. Moreover, global economic competition has
forced regions in the U.S. and abroad to compete in the realm of economic development, so it is
no longer simply a question of cities versus suburbs. In fact, many scholars would say that
central cities and surrounding parts of metropolitan areas share problems ranging from traffic
congestion to job retention to provision of water and sewer services and must band together to
deal with them. Regional scholars such as Peirce (1993) and Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom
(2001) feel that the global marketplace renders cities and metropolitan regions much more
important. Strategies for improving cities' fiscal, social, and environmental health should be
designed and implemented on a regional level rather than by individual municipalities that really
share common interests and challenges.

Specifically, the New Regionalism movement arose in

the 1990s as scholars began to question how to govern urban areas in order to address these
. concerns. This movement goes beyond the old reform debate of simply how to structure
government, asking what means of governance are most appropriate. Do we need to change our
governments, or rather, the way in which we govern? Should the arrangements be formal
structures or informal systems? Of the New Regionalists, Rusk (1995; 1999) is the most focused
on government structure.
Interdependence of core central cities, their suburbs, and exurbs provides an impetus for
a renewed focus on regional governance that waned with public choice theory and criticisms of
federal initiatives such as that of the council of government (COG) movement.
The abstract force· of globalization, with its accompanying economiC restructuring and
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trend toward geographic decentralization in urban areas, is often linked to the rising importance of
cities and their regions over the past two decades (see Savitch and Kantor 2002, e.g.).
Joel Garreau (1988) documents the growing trend in the development of edge cities and
the decline of central cities in metropolitan regions. Although he does not seem to find much fault
with this new urban form of these seemingly self-sufficient, self-contained places of work,
residence, and retail, Peirce et al .(1993), Rusk (1995; 1999), Downs (1995), Dreier et al. (2001),
and others are quite alarmed at the increasing levels of racial and income segregation,
environmental consequences of "sprawling" growth, and challenges to economic development
they associate with detachment of cities and suburbs.
Cities and their suburbs are economically interdependent. Competition between core
cities and other parts of the metropolitan area can actually hurt the region overall. Regions with
large income inequalities between the cities and suburbs grow less than other regions, and the
incomes of central cities and the suburbs tend to rise and fall together (Savitch et al. 1993; see
also Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001).
Savitch and Vogel (1996) review regional governance arrangements, providing a useful
framework ranging from various forms of "metropolitan government," to "mutual adjustment," to
"avoidance and conflict." Rather than enumerate and address every specific strategy that is
described, which would be an exhaustive task, I will group them in the following categories along
the government-governance spectrum of paths to new regionalism:
1. Formal Government Consolidations involving the City: Referring to a single-tiered
government, these strategies primarily consist of merger of a major city and the county within
which it is contained. Another approach is the annexation of unincorporated areas by a city. Very
few city-county consolidation referenda have passed, and annexations are fairly uncommon. Both
are heavily dependent on state legislatures, which make rules regarding municipal government
structures.
2. Multi-tiered Government: In practice, there are only a handful of these forms, which
include two-tiered and three-tiered governments. The two-tiered is a federative approach,
involving a metropolitan agency and local agencies, in which regional functions are organized and
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carried out separately from more local functions. Miami-Dade County is the primary example.
The three-tiered approach involves local governments, a metropolitan agency, and the state
government. The only two examples are Minneapolis-St. Paul's Metropolitan Service District,
well-known for its regional revenue-sharing arrangement, and Portland, Oregon's Metropolitan
Service District, known for its regional planning work.
3. Linked Functions and Complex Networks/Examples of "Mutual Adjustment": Cities
such as Louisville (prior to its recent consolidation) and Pittsburgh serve as examples of regions
that are not completely "fragmented," yet not consolidated. Louisville voters approved in 2000 a
city-county government that will took effect in 2003.

Prior to 2003, Louisville and its home

county, Jefferson, had many linked functions, arrangements that Stephens and Wikstrom (2000)
categorize with terms such as joint powers agreements, e.g. their city-county planning
commission, and special districts, e.g. the Transit Authority of River City. Pittsburgh has complex
networks in which public-private cooperation promoted economic development opportunities.
Voluntary, relatively informal cooperation in forms such as a council of government and business
organizations such as chambers of commerce, were relied upon.
4. Status quol"avoidance and conflict/public choice/polycentrism: These alternatives
were previously described in the first section.

Evaluations and Criteria
On what basis are we to evaluate the various alternatives for metropolitan governance?
In the literature, evaluations are commonly based on the ability to effectively deliver services in an
efficient manner. Yet, government remains charged with equal protection and treatment of its
citizens. Therefore, we might conclude that criteria for evaluation of metropolitan governance
arrangements should include equity in addition to efficiency and efficacy. In fact, these criteria
are often discussed in the literature on government and governance. Dreier, Mollenkopf, and
Swanstrom (2001) cite efficiency, environmental, economic competition, and equity as arguments
for regionalism. Savitch and Vogel (1996) note that consolidationists base their arguments on
efficiency, cost, service delivery, economic growth, and social reform. Rusk (1995; 1999), for
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example, believes that consolidated urban structures yield racial integration.
The efficiency criterion is a major selling point for consolidation and has been commonly
studied, with researchers analyzing taxes and costs before and after consolidation (e.g., Benton
and Gamble 1983; Condrey 1994).
In terms of effectiveness, proponents of city-county consolidation often claim that service
delivery is improved with this type of consolidation. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) credit the
consolidated city/county governments of Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis with providing
more effective and uniform services in their regions, particularly in the areas of mass
transportation, sewers, and water, and land-use planning. They also laud the multi-tier approach
of Portland. Research on bureaucracy and privatization of government has demonstrated some
functions, particularly capital-intensive services such as planning and infrastructure, are more
effectively, efficiently, and equitably carried out on a regional basis, whereas other more laborintensive services such as police protection and garbage collection, may be best left to smaller or
special jurisdictions to coordinate (Wilson 1989; Savas 2000). Prominent regionalists, however,
have emphasized that informal arrangements, while they may have good intentions, lack the
authority and power to achieve goals and objectives (Dreier et al. 2001, e.g.). Perhaps this is
why more formal structural reorganizations, i.e. consolidations, although they face political
challenges, continue to be seen as integral strategies.
In terms of equity, Rusk (1995; 1999), Peirce et al. (1993), and Dreier et al. (2001) find
grave racial and income disparities in areas lacking regional governance and government. Rusk
claims that segregation is lower in consolidated areas. The three-tier arrangement in
Minneapolis-St. Paul was able to redistribute tax revenues across the region. Savitch and Vogel
(1996; 2000b) also point to the success of the Louisville-Jefferson County Compact for sharing an
occupational tax between the poorer central city and the wealthier suburbs, though it proved in
2000 to be politically unpopular because of concerns about unfair treatment of the suburbs, which
contain a greater number of residents but received a disproportionately lower amount of
revenues.
The "new regionalism" movement has tended to be less focused on structure than with
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functioning, although prominent urbanist David Rusk has stressed the importance of city
boundaries in addressing severe socioeconomic problems faced by many U.S. cities. In Cities
Without Suburbs (1995), he analyzes "elastic" and "inelastic" cities, claiming that the former,
comprised of those that can increase their area-and thereby population and tax base-through
annexation or consolidation with other municipalities have and will fare better than inelastic cities.
He continues the consolidation theme in Inside Game, Outside Game (1999), emphasizing the
superiority of single "big box" government structures over multiple "little boxes" in pooling
resources, setting policies, and arranging service provision.
Rusk makes this claim about merger of central cities and the counties in which they
reside: "Without city-county consolidation, which lifted both cities out of slow erosion, the current
status of Nashville and Indianapolis would probably be not much different from that of Louisville
and Milwaukee" (1995, p. 25).
Some research offers a basis to cast some doubt as to the necessity of municipal
consolidation to improve socioeconomic conditions. Sancton (2000) refers to two Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) reports that suggest that job growth and
economic recovery may "relate only indirectly to structural arrangements" and can be
accomplished without consolidation.

3

Savitch and Vogel (2000a; 2004) have shown pre-

consolidation improvements in indicators of disparity and increased investment in Louisville.

Reorganization, Race, and Poverty
The literature on public choice and metropolitan government has tended to focus on
studies of efficiency and efficacy criteria to the detriment of equity concerns, particularly those
relating to racial minorities and the low-income population. Marshall (1972) laments the lack of
coverage of minority concerns in the early literature on reform and consolidation:
[A]II these treatments of metropolitan reform have at least one trait in commonthey have not focused on its impact on minorities. The actual or projected effects
of reorganization on blacks, browns, Indians, and Puerto Ricans are considered
superficially, if at all. Individual works sometimes include subsections on the way
Negroes have voted on reform proposals and their attitudes toward reform, but
A 1988 ACIR report examined the central city of St. Louis and the county containing it. A 1992 report
analyzed Allegheny County and Pittsburgh.
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most of the space is typically devoted to discussions of implications for suburbs
and central cities. Of course the term central city often encompasses minorities,
but it includes many other interests such as downtown businessmen and white
residents. So the racial and ethnic aspects of reorganization are too often implicit
rather than explicit. Minority interests are given much less attention than majority
interests (p. 10).

He makes a case for the study of consolidation's impact on minorities, adding,
As we have become aware that race and ethnic issues are central to a wide
variety of urban problems, reorganization must be expressly reexamined in these
terms. Since metropolitan reform involves changes in the divisions of power and
rewards, the stakes for minorities are potentially very high (p. 10).

Although Marshall's observations were made in 1972, one could make a similar
assessment of the state of the literature three decades later. Indeed, several studies on the
political and economic impacts of metropolitan reorganization have included sections or
subsections on black electoral representation or central city services, but there are few works on
reform and consolidation that focus on the impacts of racial minorities. Harrigan and Vogel
(2000, p.365-367) review the literature for impacts of consolidation on minorities, noting that most
of the studies that discuss race seem primarily concerned with minority vote dilution.
Owen and Willbern (1985) and Lyons (1977) briefly discuss race, focusing on black
opposition and electoral outcomes, in their analyses of city-county consolidations in Indianapolis
and Lexington. Owen and Willbern (1985) describe pre-consolidation attitudes by Indianapolis's
black leaders as mixed, with some enthusiastic about the potential to bring tax revenue into the
city but others concerned about dilution of voting strength. They paint a positive picture,
however, of minority electoral representation in post-consolidation Indianapolis-Marion County
Unigov, citing greater proportional representation of blacks and the continued appointment of
blacks to high administrative offices. They also claim that even though the Republican party
wrested power away from the Democrats, with whom blacks have typically identified, blacks have
leadership in the minority Democratic Party. Moreover, they believe that the fact that Republican
mayoral candidates getting more black votes post-consolidation "suggests a substantial level of
black acceptance of Unigov" (p. 199).
In contrast, others have found that blacks have suffered politically in Indianapolis. A
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1992 conference paper by William Blomquist claims that black political influence was
considerably diluted.

4

Over 90 percent of black votes were for Democratic candidates. In a city

in which Democrats did not have an overwhelming majority, the black vote became an important
base of support and allied the retention of Democratic power. Blomquist says that after Unigov,
suburban Republicans took control and blacks became a "minority within a minority." In addition,
he claims that the voting advantage of Republicans contributed to a decline in Democratic voter
turnout by discouraging voters. Moreover, in another study of Indianapolis, Blomquist and Parks
(1995), while they don't refer to race specifically, find that there is little evidence or even evidence
to the contrary that central-city residents got better services or an equitable redistribution of the
financial base. Pre-consolidation satisfaction with public services was not substantially different
between the city and county balance outside the city. Moreover, Blomquist and Parks claim that
suburban Republicans who captured Indianapolis's land and population were the primary
beneficiaries of tax/finance base sharing:
This remaking [of downtown], however, was not made possible by an
inflow of new tax dollars from the suburbs; rather, most of the public costs accrue
to residents of the pre-Unigov city, especially those who live in the Center
Township. The combination of service-delivery financing via special district and
TIF-ing downtown has given Center Township residents the highest tax burdens
in the consolidated city-county. The Unigov consolidation did not give central-city
residents access to a wider tax base. It gave suburban leaders access to the
central-city base with which to pursue development projects chosen by them, not
by city residents (1995, p. 53).

Their analysis is interesting in terms of potentially negative political impacts upon
minorities. What would have been more interesting, however, is if Blomquist and Parks had
analyzed the extent to which central-city residents, particularly minorities, had benefited from the
economic growth the Indianapolis-Marion County experienced.
Lyons (1972) treats the issue of race in consolidation campaigns in a short section in his
book on the Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky merger: He notes that it is difficult to find hard
evidence to either confirm or reject hypotheses on voter reactions by race. Some findings have
shown that "central-city blacks tend to resist being politically and governmentally consolidated

Cited in Harrigan and Vogel (2000): Blomquist. W. (1992). "Metropolitan organization and local
politics: the Indianapolis-Marion County experience." Paper presented at April 9-11, 1992, annual meeting
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with predominantly white fringe areas"; however, he notes, there are not many cases of large
majorities against merger among central-city blacks. An Augusta, Georgia consolidation was
only narrowly defeated even though the city was 50% black. In Nashville and Jacksonville, he
adds, merger passed although there was a solid black majority in opposition in Nashville but not
in Jacksonville. The higher approval by blacks in Jacksonville could have been influenced by the
high probability of more annexations if the merger didn't pass. In Lexington, 85% of blacks lived
in the central city but constituted a relatively small proportion-about 15 % --of the population.
Lyons says blacks had little to gain from opposition and faced at worst slight dilution of voting
power. As was the case in Jacksonville, failure of merger would very likely mean more
annexations and the at-large electoral system, under which blacks had not reached a critical
mass of representation, would continue.
Swanson (2000) says that Jacksonville's consolidation with Duval County diluted the
black vote because the inner city was 40 percent black but the population in the merged citycounty was only about 25 percent black. He notes (p. 234) that blacks gained "a degree of
access, representation, and influence, although suburban white interests continued to be
politically dominant." This is consistent with Swanson's earlier analysis of Jacksonville, in which
he says that black representation on the city council is more or less proportionate to blacks' share
of the population, but notes that the number of Republican seats is increasing and that white
suburbanites wield power (Swanson 1996). Moreover, he suggests that race played a part in
garnering support for consolidation. Increased racial and economic segregation contributed to
social unrest that made business and civic leaders uncomfortable. "Although race was a latent
issue," he claims, "some white leaders understood the need to dilute the influence of black innercity residents" (p.235).
Seamon and Feiock (1995, p. 1745) claim that "[i]n the short run, access of minorities can
be guaranteed by drawing one or more minority districts, but in the long-run minority
representation is diluted." Their study of the impact of consolidation upon political participation is
designed to address a void in the literature. Examination of voter turnout in Jacksonville and

of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago.
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Duval County over 33 years, 14 prior to consolidation and 19 thereafter, reveals that
consolidation had a statistically significant negative impact on both average and high voter
turnout, reducing the figures by 17.6 and 18 percent respectively (Seamon and Feiock 1995).
Although Seamon and Feiock do not address voter data by race, they suggest that the decrease
in participation merits further research as to whether consolidated government disenfranchises
"historically underrepresented groups" (1995, p. 1750).
Swanson (1996), in addition to discussing the political impacts of consolidation on
minorities, treats the issue of socioeconomic equity. Supporters of consolidation in Jacksonville
emphasized "textbook" principles in reorganization: economic efficiency, administrative
effectiveness, political accountability, and socioeconomic and political equity (p. 234). "Urban
reformers," he says, "tend to emphasize effectiveness and efficiency, with some reference to
accountability (with better representation of minorities on the City CounCil), but with virtually no
reference to the equity and the needs of lower-income families" (p. 234). Although merging the
inner city population with the suburban county population into the new consolidated area
statistically diluted socioeconomic concerns such as poverty, disparities between residents of the
inner city and suburban residents, as well as those between blacks and whites, remain
considerable. Swanson says Jacksonville remains one of the country's most segregated
metropolitan areas. His comparison of indicators such as poverty, educational attainment,
median family income, employment rates, and the number of female-headed households reveals
that residents of the "urban core" have the highest rates of poverty, unemployment, and singleparent families and the lowest levels of education and income. Moreover, black families were
disproportionately low-income compared to whites.
The lack of attention to impacts upon minorities and the poor in central cities is somewhat
ironic given that Rusk prescribes consolidation as a remedy to the segregation of such persons in
cities, which he calls perhaps the most pressing problem the metropolitan United States faces.
Regionalists such as Neil Peirce agree that regional approaches to government and governance
are necessary to address the racial and economic segregation. In one of the few examinations of
metropolitan organization focusing solely on race, john a. powell (2000) is adamant that a
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federated regional system is necessary to alleviate the socioeconomic problems associated with
isolation and concentration of poor minorities in central cities.
Some scholars and other proponents of consolidation have questioned the prioritization
of black representation in central cities over the reorganization of metropolitan government,
claiming that it is preferable to have some influence and share in a stronger, more viable urban
government rather than dominate a financially-distressed, declining city (Krefetz and Sharaf 1977;
Rusk 1995,1999). Their claims and policy recommendations, however, are based largely on
theory rather than based on empirical research or statistical analysis. For his comparison of
"elastic" and inelastic" cities in Cities Without Suburbs, Rusk grouped 14 cities into seven pairings
based on similar numbers of new homebuyers from 1950-1990 and black percentage of total
population. Does this make sense as the major basis of comparability? Some of the pairings
represent cities from the same region of the county, but is it fair to compare Houston with Detroit
or Syracuse with Albuquerque? Since segregation measures tended to be higher in the "elastic"
cities, Rusk concludes that consolidation (since many cities have limited ability to annex outlying
areas) is necessary. Swanson's 1996 analysis of socioeconomic disparities in Jacksonville
provides reason to test the assertion that metropolitan consolidation as a form of regional
governance will improve the lot of inner city minorities and the poor.

The Need for Literature on Race and Consolidation
As a "path to the new regionalism," consolidation, in particular city-county consolidation,
remains an important research topic in the field of urban and public affairs. The Fall 2000 State
and Local Government Review symposium focused on "paths to the new regionalism," included

three articles on consolidation. Public Administration Quarterly's Summer 2000 symposium
asked: "Is city-county consolidation good policy?" Prominent urban scholar David Rusk promotes
city-county consolidation as a means to better governance. Cities such as Memphis and
Pittsburgh have been re-considering consolidation in the wake of the 2003 merger of Louisville
and Jefferson County, Kentucky governments.
The urban governance literature focused on the theme, "Does structure matter?" offers
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relatively few studies on structure and its impact upon racial groups. Altshuler et al. (1999) note
that the claim by Rusk, Neil Peirce, and others that structure does matter in the case of
consolidated government and the well-being of minorities and low-income people is a relatively
untested claim in need of empirical research.
This study seeks to begin to fill the research void by examining whether and how citycounty consolidation has affected blacks politically, particularly in terms of voter participation.

Voting Literature, Blacks, and Consolidation
Interestingly, in addition to a dearth of literature on impacts of consolidation on minorities,
there is also a noted lack of emphasis on consolidation's impact on voter participation, note
Seamon and Feiock (1995), who discuss reasons that consolidation may impact political access
and participation:
First, voters may perceive that individual political actions, particularly voting, have
less consequence in larger government. The influence of particular community
interests in diluted by expanding the size of the jurisdiction. Second, reforms
making local government more professional and bureaucratic may result in
citizens perceiving that metro government is unresponsive to individual or local
needs ... Third consolidation may also increase the importance of big money in
local elections. Numerous studies show that campaign spending is the most
important factor in predicting outcomes in a variety of kinds of local elections. By
increasing the cost of pursuing office, consolidated government may make public
office less available to those without personal wealth or access to special interest
money (p. 1746).

Seamon and Feiock (1995) found in their time-series analysis that consolidation reduced
average voter turnout by 17.6% in Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Their analysis did not
include a breakdown by race.
Voter turnout is a primary indicator of political participation, which reflects both citizen

interest in as well as a sense of power in the political arena. Enfranchisement allows citizens to
register their opinions and preferences by voting for the candidates they feel best represent their
interests. Election of the preferred candidate, in theory, benefits the citizen when the elected
official makes policy decisions in the interest of the citizen. Various factors affect levels of
general voter turnout, including the type of election, i.e., offices at stake, key issues at stake,
particular candidates, and competitiveness of the election.
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Kenneth Thompson, who has written on the importance of voting, particularly for blacks,
comments,
"The century-long history of black attempts to achieve the right to vote and white
attempts, particularly in the South, to deny them that right illuminates the stakes
involved. Voting is no mere privilege, nor is it just an act of symbolic significance.
The right to vote is a fundamental political right because, as the Supreme Court
has ruled, it is "preservative of all rights." (Reynolds v. Syms, 377 U.S. 533,
1964). Since exercise of the franchise is an essential means by which our
citizens ensure that those governing will be responsible, denial of access to the
ballot box ultimately results in the denial of other fundamental rights." (Thompson
1982, p. 2).

The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 gave
minorities, especially blacks, legal recourse to fight race-based discrimination and voice their
political choices. Restrictions on voting had included tactics such as literacy requirements,
residence requirements, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and the white primary (A It 1984;
Davidson & Grofman 1994).
Thompson's 1982 examination of the impact of the VRA focuses on political participation
and the voting behavior of blacks.

This analysis relies on Census biennial post-election surveys

of households. Samples are large but problematic because data are self-reported and
respondents are also asked about the voting behavior of other household members. He notes
that attempts to validate the national data at the local level with local registration and election
data show "consistent overreporting" for both blacks and whites, although it is slightly higher for
blacks. However:
" ... though the absolute levels of black electoral participation reported in the
Census data are likely to be higher than in reality, the trends from year to year
appear to reflect actual progressions reliably, owing to the relative constancy with
which black citizens overreport their electoral participation ... " (Thompson 1982, p.
6)
Thompson (1982) notes that there was a 1964-1980 downward national trend in electoral
participation among the population in general. Southern blacks were the only group to reported a
net gain in participation in those years, which he attributes to the VRA. The trend
" ... suggests the early impact of the Voting Rights Act was to stimulate black
registration, voting efforts and candidacy by blacks who, for the first time, saw a
realistic possibility of electoral success in certain districts" (Thompson 1982,
p.16).

14

Interestingly, in Florida and Tennessee-both states in which a city-county consolidation
occurred in the 1960s-voting registration rates for blacks were at their peak, about 60 percent,
prior to the VRA. It had risen quickly since the 1940s, when "no southern state had a black voter
registration rate above 7 percent." (A It 1984, p. 354).
Even though the VRA may have helped empower blacks politically and enhance their
electoral participation on a national and regional level, particularly in the South, metropolitan
government structure also may have had an impact. Harrigan and Vogel (2003) note that
"[c]reation of metropolitan governments threatens minorities-especially African Americans-with
dilution of their voting power" (p. 273).
"The techniques most likely to dilute African American voting influence were
probably annexation and at-large elections. Annexation is felt to reduce African
American influence when a city annexes suburban white residents and thereby
decreases the proportion of the city's electorate that is African American. Atlarge elections, it is charged, enable the white majority to minimize if not prevnet
African American representation on the city council" (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p.
121 ).
In general, studies have concluded that district/ward versus at-large representation and
elections can make a positive difference in African American representation. However, scholars
such as Charles S. Bullock charge that ward elections amount to "little more than token
representation" and can trade off substantive representation because racial barriers may be
enforced with ward systems with their descriptive representation (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p. 123).
Grofman and Davidson (1994) found at-large elections in majority-white cities with black
population of at least 10 percent to have a "deleterious effect" on black representation. In cities
that elected by district, "black officeholding was practically nonexistent in council districts less
than 40 percent black buLit was close to 100 percent of all officeholders in districts greater than
60 percent black" (p.320).
Alford & Lee (1968) found that nonpartisan elections and reformed government structures
(defined in terms of council-manager or appointed mayor versus elected mayor-council) tend to
reduce voter turnout. Their earlier findings were supported by later work by Karnig and Walter
(1983), who did, however, see a regional improvement in voter turnout in the South, which they
attribute to the VRA.
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In general, political participation has tended to be equated with voter turnout (Leighley
1995). Leighley reviews the participation literature on the "standard socioeconomic model"
(SES), mobilization theory, and rational choice theory. The widely-accepted SES model,
developed from the seminal work of Verba and Nie (1972), holds that participation is driven by
time, money, skills and civic orientations. Education and income are key variables, as is
occupation. Higher socioeconomic status people are more likely to participate. Most of the
evidence on mobilization model focuses on voter turnout. Motivations for mobilization include
close or competitive elections, high campaign spending, and multiple races on the ballot.
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also discuss party contacting, electoral competitiveness, social
movements, voluntary associations, and group memberships. Verba and Nie (1972) also find
active memberships in associations, particularly political organizations, affect turnout.
Rationality choice theory weighs the costs and benefits of participation. Positive aspects of
participation include broad societal benefits, such as preservation of democracy, and individual
benefits, such as the minimization of the probability of a least preferred candidate winning.
Although Leighley urges that research be conducted on other forms of political
participation such as joining groups, campaigning, and making direct contacts, she notes that
"lack of appropriate data on participation other than voting makes it nearly impossible to assess
the consequences of the types of participation that are probably most likely to have a direct
influence on government officials" (Leighley 1995, p. 196).
However, it remains important to study voting participation. Work by Hill and Leighley
(1992) and others has shown that "who votes matters." For example, higher levels of turnout
among the poor are associated with higher welfare benefits.
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) tested five participation theories-Socioeconomic Status,
Psychological Resources, Social Connectedness, Group Identity or Consciousness, and Group
Conflict-across four racial/ethnic groups-Anglos, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and
Mexican-Americans-using data drawn from a statewide public opinion survey in Texas.
Psychological Resources refer to factors such as political interest and trust in government. Social
Connectedness relates to factors such as organizational involvement, church attendance, marital
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status, homeownership. Group conflict refers to competition for resources, hostility, or fear, e.g.,
the conflict seen between whites and blacks in the South in the earlier twentieth century.
Testing Socioeconomic Status (SES) using education and income and Social
Connectedness using homeownership, length of residence, and marital status, the SES and
Psychological models were strongly supported. The Social Connectedness model was partially
supported; homeownership was significant only for some groups (not blacks or white) and marital
status was not significant for any. Intergroup distance as measure of group identity was
significant for blacks and Asians, although the relationship was opposite that predicted: if one
feels more distant from other groups, one participates less (Leighley & Vedlitz 1999).
Other research has shown more of a connection between blacks' social connectedness
and group identity and their political participation. Racial group consciousness has been linked to
mobilization by Verba and Nie 1972 and Shingles 1981. Dawson, Brown, and Allen (1990) found
that blacks with higher socioeconomic status and religious guidance are more likely to participate
in political process in the form of voting, campaigning, and contacting public officials. Exposure to
black media sources and a racial-identity belief system also contributed to increased involvement
in the political system by blacks, although SES and religiosity were the two major predictors of
voting. Religiosity was measured based on questions from 1980 National Survey of Black
Americans: how often read religious books, watch or listen to programs, pray, ask someone to
pray for you, and how religious would you say you areas. Racial beliefs were measured by
closeness to black mass groups such as church, working, rich, poor, etc., elite groups, black
autonomy, positive sterotypes, negative stereotypes.
Murray and Vedlitz (1977) note that black participation has been shown in the literature to
be higher than one would expect given the lower SES of blacks. They used census data and
precinct level electoral data to examine how SES variables within racial groups might affect voting
participation. Precincts were chosen because they tend to be racially and economically
homogeneous. Registration rates were about the same for blacks and whites in the mid-1970s,
and turnout differences between blacks and white were relatively small. A gain in black
participation versus white could not be explained entirely by SES since black SES did not
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considerably increase relative to white SES. Murray and Vedlitz indicate that the gain might
support the idea that "blacks participate at much higher levels in political affairs than one would
expect given their relative socioeconomic status in American society" (p. 1067). A positive
relation between higher SES and voting was found for blacks, although less pronounced than for
whites.
Murray and Vedlitz (1977) offer two hypotheses in concluding comments. First, as Verba
and Nie (1972) have posited, blacks participate more because of their awareness of blacks as a
deprived group. Secondly, blacks may be better organized than whites in the communities in the
study, leading to higher levels of registration and voting than expected. Observers in those five
communities "thought that local blacks were more highly organized for electoral politics than were
local whites" (p. 1071).
More recent research on black voter turnout as a form of political participation, a Census
Bureau working paper, examined black voter turnout in congressional elections, analyzing
differences in black turnout by various demographic factors. In general, black voter participation
increased with factors such as age, educational attainment, and income, although it began to
decrease once passing middle age, middle income, and baccalaureate education levels (Gaither
& Newburger 2000).
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CHAPTER II
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

Research Premise and Methodology Overview
There are many questions about the impact of consolidation on minorities; however, the
aim of this study is to begin to fill the literature void by examining how consolidation has affected
blacks politically, particularly in terms of voting participation. This examination takes the form of a
collective case study analyzing three truly large, metropolitan cities before and after consolidation
with their home counties. Included in the pre-post analysis are Nashville-Davidson County, and
Jacksonville-Duval County, and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County consolidation.
Indianapolis-Marion County was also intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be
excluded (see Appendix B).5 These cities have been selected because they are the only cases of
city-county consolidation of this size in the past century, according to Harrigan and Vogel (2003):
"Counting Louisville, there have been only four successful consolidations in
larger cities (250,000 or more people) since the early 1900s: Nashville-Davidson
County (1962), Jacksonville-Duval County (1967), and Indianapolis-Marion
County (1969)" (p.259-260).
Essentially, analysis of these sites would exhaust the population of large-scale consolidations,
similar to the approach of Skocpol in a 1979 study of social revolutions (as cited in Feagin, Orum,
& Sjoberg 1991). Other smaller consolidated city-counties would not be comparable.
Scale is an issue for political impact in these cities because they each initially contained
over a quarter-million persons and sizeable black populations, e.g., pre-consolidation Jacksonville
was approximately 40 percent black. Moreover, each city significantly increased its size with the
consolidation of a county that added at least 100,000 "suburbanites." Moreover, the suburban

Analysis of Indianapolis is limited due to restrictions on data and the availability of maps, so this
study focuses on the three other cities and includes discussion of Indianapolis-Marion County in
the appendix.
5
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areas tend to be white and more largely Republican-leaning than the central city. Harrigan and
Vogel (2003) note that "African Americans are primarily Democratic and concentrated in the
central city" (p. 275). One might expect consolidation, then, to have a considerable impact on
black voting power and consequently, participation.
Furthermore, it is important to focus analysis of voting behavior of blacks on the
metropolitan cities that consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century because the
federal legislation in the 1960s set the stage for greater political equity of racial minorities.
A common criticism of the case study approach is that it lacks generalizability. According
to Yin, "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical positions and not to
populations or universes" (1974, p.23 as cited in Snow and Anderson 1991 p.165). He cited their
utility in clarifying theory. Earlier work by Eckstein (1975) also outlined the value of case studies
in building and testing theory, such as the "crucial case" or "most-likely" and "least-likely" fit case.
Improved validity may be an advantage of case study. Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991,
p. 19) state: "Although the case study must rely on a good deal of judgment, exercised by the
observer, the great strength of this form is that it does permit the observer to assemble
complementary and overlapping measures of the same phenomena."

The advantage comes

from using multiple sources of data.
This study employs both quantitative and qualititative forms of data, with quantitative
examination of pre-consolidation and post-consolidation election data complemented by
qualitative contextual analysis. According to Babbie (2001, p.344), "[t]he most effective evaluation
research is one that combines qualitative and quantitative components."
The mixed methods approach, as it has come to be called, is increasingly employed in
social science research (Creswell 2003). Of the three forms Creswell discusses-sequential,
concurrent, and transformativEr-this study takes an approach most similar to the sequential form,
though in a different order, featuring qualitative discussion followed up with quantitative analysis.
The quantitative portion of the research is based on voter participation data from
precincts with a majority black population. In addition, levels of both descriptive and sUbstantive
representation for blacks are discussed, in terms of the number of blacks elected pre- and post-
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consolidation and partisan electoral representation; representation may provide some insight into
voter participation.
The study is also informed by qualitative analysis that explores the context for results
seen in the quantitative analysis.

Babbie notes that problems of validity might result because

content analysis is "limited to the examination of recorded communications" (2001, p. 315).
However, Babbie cites advantages of content analysis, including that it is economical, and it also
allows the study of processes occurring over a long period of time.
Review of archived newspaper articles and publications of local groups with an interest in
government and/or race issues provide a more contextual basis for understanding how the
governmental structure affected blacks politically, i.e., in terms of voter participation and
involvement with the electoral process. Some select interviews with local experts supplement the
data in Nashville and Jacksonville.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
The overarching question is "How does city-county consolidation affect black voter
participation in local government elections?" There are three possibilities: it is not affected, it
decreases, or it increases. Because the impact of consolidation on blacks' voting behavior has
not been substantially treated in the literature, it is difficult to hypothesize the effects. Given the
scale of the four consolidations and the resulting possible dilution of minority voting strength,
some directional change should be expected. The participation literature has shown that blacks

may behave differently from whites due to factors such as racial group identity (Verba and Nie
1972; Murray and Vedlitz 1977; Shingles 1981; Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990). Blacks may
have been mobilized by a perceived threat to their voting strength as a result of consolidation, for
example.
The independent variable in this study, however, is the consolidation of the central city
and its county. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, post-conSOlidation, black voting behavior would
decrease in accordance with the consolidation literature, as in Seamon and Feiock's 1995 study
of general voting behavior. Black voters may have been discouraged by the dilution of their
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voting power and consequently stayed home from the polls.
This study's primary hypothesis is that black voter turnout in local government elections
decreases following large-scale consolidations. We should see decreasing levels of black voter
participation over time, beginning with the election preceding consolidation and including a
minimum of two to three post-consolidation local government elections. Decreased levels of
voting participation may also coincide with a decrease in descriptive or substantive representation
due to the scale of the consolidations and the number of suburban whites and Republicans added
to the electoral base.

Lower black voter turnout would likely have a detrimental effect on black

representation.
Several secondary hypotheses stem from the primary question and hypothesis. Because
consolidation's impact on black voting has been largely unexamined, it is important to begin to
apply black voting behavior theories in an examination of consolidation and black voting. The
participation literature has also shown that the Socioeconomic Status (SES) model holds for
blacks and that there may also be a Social Connectedness role; therefore, we might expect to
see variations among blacks according to various demographic and/or socioeconomic variables.
Along with a hypothesized decrease in black voting participation, there may be decreases seen
among subgroups of blacks. In essence, the lower the SES, the further consolidation might
dampen black voting behavior. In this study, for example, majority black precincts with lower
family incomes may have lower turnout rates than majority black precincts with higher incomes.
Each sub-hypothesis addresses how black voter turnout may vary by characteristics
including education, income, poverty, tenure, and age. A directional hypothesis is specified for
each.
In terms of education, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout decreases with less
education.
For income, the hypothesis is that black voter participation decreases as income levels
decrease.
Both of these variables are key components of the widely-accepted Socioeconomic
Status participation model, which has been shown to hold for the general population as well as for
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blacks (Dawson, Brown, & Allen 1990; Leighley & Vedlitz 1999, for example).
It is hypothesized that, in terms of poverty, black voter turnout is lower among poverty
households. Although poverty is not a component of the SES model, poverty is closely
associated with income. Blacks, particularly central city blacks, also tend to have high poverty
rates.
In terms of household tenure, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout is higher among
owners than among renters. Homeownership is often considered a measure of Social
Connectedness. Although the work of Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) did not find a significant
relationship between tenure and participation for blacks, there may be a connection, particularly
since lower-income households are not typically homeowners. Moreover, it is interesting to
examine the tenure relationship for blacks given lower homeownership rates for blacks relative to
whites.
Finally, it is hypothesized that black voter turnout is depressed among younger
populations. The voting literature holds that participation increases with age for whites and the
general population. Age is a crucial variable to examine for blacks given that the black population
is a younger population, so the voting age population tends to be smaller for blacks than for
whites.
All sub-hypotheses are consistent with previous voter participation literature, which holds
that older persons, those who have more education and income, and homeowners are more likely
to vote (Bass & Kasper 1999).

Data and Operationalization
The methodology of the study is built on pre-post consolidation election analysis of three
large consolidated city-counties: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; Jacksonville-Duval
County, Florida; and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky. Aside from Indianapolis-Marion
County, which was intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be excluded (see
Appendix B), these cities are the only ones of their size to have undergone a consolidation, which
essentially exhausts the population of large urban consolidations. Smaller city-county
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consolidation sites, such as Athens-Clarke County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte, Kansas,
would not be comparable.
Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville share a similar development pattern in terms of
black political representation in municipal government and steps toward local government
reorganization.

6

For each of those three cities, there was a long period without any black

representation at the local level. In Nashville and Jacksonville, blacks had served in local
government in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but there were decades-long breaks. In Louisville,
the first black representative was elected to the Board of Aldermen in the 1940s. Nashville filled
its 40-year void in 1951, but Jacksonville didn't have a breakthrough in black representation until
the late 1960s, earlier in the year in which a consolidation referendum passed.

Moreover, each

city had a history of government restructuring or proposals to do so. Both Nashville and Louisville

Figure 2.1
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had previous failed city-county consolidation attempts. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the
timelines for representation and restructuring milestones in each of the three cities, along with

Indianapolis differs in that consolidation happened directly as a result of an act of the state
legislature, not following a public referendum.
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elections preceding and following the successful consolidation referenda.

Figure 2.2
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Louisville Reorganization Timeline

~

mayoral election--now

annexatio n attempts

coincides with fed election
~

first consolidation
referendum fails

first black elected to Board
of Aldermen

rnayoral election

second consolidation
referendum fails
.-" .•

i.

~,......,

1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968:1972 1976 1980 1984'1988 1992 1996 2000:2004 2008
proposed Morton Wyatt
Plan for expansion

... mayoral el¢tion
,-

"The Compact"··
moratorium on
annexations

proposed Mallon Plan for
expansion

newgovemment

.!. mayoral election

.-

third consolidation
referendum passes

In each site-with the exception of Indianapolis due to limitations on available maps and
data-voter data are analyzed for the last one or two municipal elections including a mayoral race
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preceding the consolidation and a minimum of two to three municipal mayoral elections following
the consolidation. Moreover, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville are each matched with a
comparable non-consolidated city within their respective states, as a control of sorts.
Voting turnout data are obtained through local government offices and/or local newspaper
archives.
Local election data are examined at the lowest possible level, the precinct, unless data
availability issues require substitution of a larger level, with the unit of analysis as majority black
voting precincts. A simple majority is greater than 50 percent. The voting rights literature
references a "65 percent rule" (e.g., Swain 1995). The iterature on residential segregation by
race utilizes a 60 percent "hypersegregation" criterion (Massey & Denton 1993). Segregation
data have also tended to show a "racial tipping point" in which whites would prefer not to live in a
neighborhood; polls have indicated that the median white's ideal neighborhood is 75 percent
white, 25 percent non-white. Moreover, data show that the median black lives in a neighborhood
that is 52 percent black (Easterly 2004.) While a simple majority could have sufficed for the
purpose of this study, especially since that is the basis on which consolidated government plans
have counted majority black districts, 70 percent is used as a cut-off because of the high degree
of residential segregation in the study sites; the vast majority of black areas are above 70 percent
black.
Because local voter data are not generally available by race, black districts are
determined by matching voting precincts to their respective Census tracts for which
socioeconomic and demographic data are available. Since the demographic data are not
available for the individual voters, analysis is limited to black district descriptive statistics such as
the average, median, and range of the socioeconomic characteristics of district households.
Specific socioeconomic characteristics data examined in detail include those outlined in
the research questions and hypotheses section: education, income, and household tenure. Data
for these variables is collected from Census summary data for the units of analysis. Education
will be based on aggregate levels of educational attainment, including percentages with "less than
high school," "some college," etc. Income is based primarily on median household income.
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Tenure is based on percent owners and/or percent renters. Poverty and age, initially planned for
examination, have been removed due to data restrictions.
For the qualitative portion of the analysis, select interviews with local consolidation
experts (in Nashville and Jacksonville), newspaper articles, and various local publications related
to the consolidation and post-consolidation elections help inform the interpretation of the study's
findings. The latter are particularly useful for the older consolidations since many of the local
leaders at the time of the consolidations may no longer be living.
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CHAPTER III
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY BACKGROUND

Nashville was the first of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A 1962
public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local government
through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks comprised over onethird of the city's population, and the support of the black community was considered essential to
the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and representation in
Nashville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and the push for
consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power and
participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND NASHVILLE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION
In the post-Civil War period through 1900, blacks held 77 elected or appointed public
positions in Tennessee, 19 of whom were elected to the state's general assembly and 25 of
whom served in city governments. Few blacks were elected or appointed to any state, county, or
municipal office in Tennessee for most of the period between 1900 and 1965. Scott (1964)
attributes the phenomenon to apathy and a lack of organization.
But for the most part, the majority of Negroes in Tennessee followed the line of
least resistance and made no attempts to participate in the political affairs of the
state. It was further evidenced during this sixty-five year period that Negroes in
Tennessee made feeble efforts in presenting themselves as candidates for
political positions, whether elective or appointive. Those who made
announcements and presented themselves for office, in most cases were
subjected to the most feeble political support from the Negroes in their voting
district. With reference to the apathy among Negro voters, the Nashville Banner
quoted a panel of Negro political and civic leaders of Nashville and Davidson
County as saying, 'The Negro must loose his apathy toward politics and voting if
he is to enjoy first class citizenship.' ... It would seem that Negroes were divided
into numerous political camps and small organizations throughout the state and
overlooked the political advantage of voting as a solid group (Scott 1964, p. 89).
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Democratic Nashville is described as having two factions, one of which was more
"sympathetic" toward blacks. Black candidates ran for Nashville City Council and were defeated
in 1939 and 1943. No black was elected to municipal office in Nashvi"e from 1912 until after
1950. By then, some strong black political organizations had begun to develop in Tennessee,
including the City-County Democratic League of Nashville and Davidson County, which organized
with only five members in 1938 and swelled to over 6,000 members by 1950 (Scott 1964). In
1951, two black men, Alexander Looby and Robert Li"ard, were elected as council members in
Nashville. Looby won in the general election against another black man; there were no white
candidates in the fifth ward's first district. Blacks ran in four other districts, but among those only
Li"ard won, in a run-off race in the second ward's third district. Scott (1964) notes that three new
black candidates in addition to Looby and Li"ard ran for office in other districts in 1955 but were
defeated.
Moody (1965) notes that blacks comprised 37.9 percent of the "core city" population and
"there were none outside Nashvi"e" (p. 44).
Black politics in Nashvi"e in the 1950s and 1960s are characterized by Moody (1965) as
"somewhat atypical" and "difficult to categorize." Moody adds,
There are Negro ward bosses who serve as the flunkies of white politicians; there
is a traditional Negro political machine, bearing some similarities to the Dawson
machine of Chicago; there are individual Negro leaders with great personal
prestige but little organizational apparatus; and there is a group of middle class
Negroes who have been able to develop an effective political organization of their
own (Moody 1965, p. 44).
Nashvi"e was considered a "center of Negro higher education" with Fisk University,
Meharry Medical College, and Tennessee A & I (Moody 1965, p.44).
1960 Census data show that the black population was concentrated near the central
business district,
"on the western bank of the Cumberland River, on the eastern side of the loop
made by the river. The Negro district runs westward along this loop, bounded
roughly to the north by Jefferson Street. South of West End Avenue (or
Broadway) the Negro district begins near 17th Avenue (the actual line of
demarcation is probably Division Street) and runs eastward to the river" (Moody
1965, p. 45).
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The push for consolidation
Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Nashville and Davidson County were
governed by a city council and strong mayor, and a county court and executive judge,
respectively. Democrats dominated the political scene in Middle Tennessee, but "party struggle
play[ed] a very limited part in local government" (Booth 1963, p. 12).
Nashville and Davidson County consolidated following a successful public vote in 1962.
Voters had previously rejected a proposal in 1958. In both instances, a dual majority was
required. In 1958, city residents supported the plan, but residents of the outlying county did not.
In 1962, residents of the county heartily supported the consolidation, but the plan passed with
limited support in the city (Booth 1963).
Interest had grown in government reform as the Nashville population began to shift
outside of the central city into the outlying portions of

533~square-mile

Davidson County.

Consequently, the city was losing its tax base of wealthier residents and supporting a mostly lowincome black population, while the county was not prepared to handle urban services to the
rapidly growing population. A large portion of the county outside Nashville was not served by key
urban services. A sewer system was missing in many areas and street and sidewalk
infrastructure could not keep pace with growth. Police, fire, and garbage services were offered
on a small-scale and subscription basis (Booth 1963).
Robert Horton, a former Planning Commission staff member and later special assistant to
former Davidson County judge and Nashville mayor Beverly Briley, said that although
consolidation had been discussed in a 1952 report he helped write for the Community Services
Commission, consolidation had not generated much public interest until Briley gave a speech at
the Rotary Club in 1955 (Bucy 1995, Horton interview transcript).
Harry Lester, a member of the Tennessee General Assembly elected in 1957, said that
he became aware of the issue of consolidation in Nashville and Davidson County "when people in
the city became fearful that a black could get elected mayor" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Lester interview
transcript).
The separate planning commissions in Davidson County and Nashville recommended
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consolidation in a jOint October 1956 report. In 1957, the Davidson County legislative delegation
introduced an act to authorize a charter commission to study government reform in Davidson
County. It was subsequently approved, and the mayor and judge appointed members, including
a "Negro" councilman. The charter commission introduced a reform proposal calling for a 21member metropolitan council. The state legislature enacted a constitutional amendment allowing
a vote on the issue, requiring approval of the measure separately in both the county and the city
(Booth 1963).
The referendum was defeated in June 1958, with the city approving and the county
balance rejecting the plan. Supporters included both large newspapers-the Tennessean and
the Nashville Banner-the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor and county judge, the League of
Women Voters, and other citizens groups in the Citizens Committee for Metro Government.
Booth (1963) notes that, perhaps due to the influence of the black councilman supporting
consolidation, the "two precincts dominated by Negro residents only narrowly voted against
adoption. Some observers considered this a moral victory, for it had generally been assumed
that the Negro voters of Nashville would strongly oppose consolidation" (Booth 1963, p.65).
Vocal opposition came mostly from county/suburban teachers groups, firefighters, and police in
the last week before the vote. According to Booth (1963), a lack of ardent pro-consolidation
campaigning to educate the public and gain strong support was probably a major factor in the
defeat. He also notes that many city council members and county magistrates would have lost
positions, since the 22 council member positions and 53 magistrate positions would have been
reduced to a 21-member metropolitan council.
Following the failed referendum, Davidson County raised taxes and Nashville began to
annex areas in order to address financial woes. The Tennessean renewed its support of a
consolidated government. while the Banner opposed further efforts, opining that the people had
spoken. When the city annexed some industrial areas in 1958 and some residential areas in
1960. interest in Metro was revived by some concerned citizens. In 1961, a preliminary
referendum question asked voters to ratify a legislative act to activate a new commission to
prepare another charter for consolidated government. The referendum passed in August. and a
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charter commission consisting of the same members as in 1958, plus two new members, was
appointed and introduced a new charter in 1962 (Booth 1963).
The major difference between the 1958 and 1962 charters was the composition of the
council. Forty council members would be elected, 35 from districts and five at large. In addition,
a vice mayor would be elected at large, creating a 41-member council with a strong mayor for
Nashville Metro. The 1962 referendum passed in both the city and the county, although the
support base was nearly a reverse from 1958, with the county balance strongly supporting Metro
and support in the city narrower. Campaigning by both supporters and opponents was
enthusiastic and began early, unlike the previous effort. This time the mayor and one of the big
newspapers were strong opponents of Metro, while supporters in the Citizens Committee for
Better Government included many of the previous supporters such as the Tennessean, Chamber
of Commerce members, and the League of Women Voters (Booth 1963).
The 1962 charter commission had 10 members. Eight of them had previously served in
1958. Those eight included two blacks: G.S. Meadors, "a retired Negro druggist," and Z.
Alexander Looby, "a popular Negro attorney and city councilman" (Hawkins 1966, p. 71).
"The major issues were once again the disposition of the schools, representation on the
Metro council (including the question of Negro representation), the nature of the two taxing
districts, and the provisions relating to pensions, civil service, and other employee matters"
(Hawkins 1966, p. 73).

Representation issues
When the state legislature amended the constitution to allow cities and counties to
consolidate and authorized a charter commission, Robert Horton was assigned to work for the
Charter Commission. Among the key issues the commission debated was the size of the council
and the number of at-large members. Horton said that black commission member Alexander
Looby wanted more districts and fewer at-large seats, baSically conveying that, "you are going to
need to be able to say to the black community that this is not just a device to eliminate our right to
representation" (Bucy 1995, p. 10 of Horton interview transcript).
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George Barrett, prominent attorney and consolidation advocate, recalled a meeting with
black leaders Avon Williams and Charlie Johnson. He and his colleagues made the argument
that
' ... you can either cooperate and help create this and you'll have some significant
voice. If you let it happen through annexation, the city will just continue to spread
out to the white suburbs and the black vote will be diluted.' The blacks would
have a smaller percentage of the seats if annexation continued. The argument
for the blacks was that you could be enlightened and cut yourself a deal or you
could be unenlightened and left out. 'It was one of those times when your
interests and the public interests merges' (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Barrett interview
transcript).
Beverly Briley, Davidson County jUdge-executive who served as Nashville's mayor from
1963 to 1975, said that Alexander Looby's support of consolidation was critical. So respected
was Looby that Briley felt he could have been Nashville's first black mayor if he had opposed
consolidation (Bucy 1995). Another Charter Commission member, businessman Victor Johnson,
recalls advising Looby,
If we don't have Metropolitan government for Nashville, the core city will atrophy
and whoever is the first black mayor will have nothing but trouble. It is much
better in your lifetime and in my lifetime, for this community to grow and prosper
economically and the lot of the blacks will improve with it (Bucy 1995, p. 2 of
Johnson interview transcript).
David Scobey, who was elected to an at-large seat on the first metropolitan council and later
served as Vice-Mayor, said that Johnson helped convince Looby to support consolidation and
that many people believed Looby could be the mayor. He was seen as "the key to the black
community" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Scobey interview transcript).
In public hearings in October 1961, Robert Lillard, a black attorney who was a city
councilman, spoke. "It was understood, of course, that Lillard represented those Negroes who
were concerned lest consolidated government cancel their growing strength in the old city. If
automatic reapportionment could be achieved, plus representation based strictly upon population,
the Negroes' cause would obviously be better served" (Hawkins 1966, p. 74).
"District boundaries were drawn up so the 29 of them were predominantly white and 6
predominantly Negro. (Some Negroes charged, however, that the lines were located in such a
manner as to give them six possible representatives and no more in the foreseeable future).
Automatic reapportionment was also included in the charter" (Hawkins 1966, p. 75).
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The 1962 charter commission redrew the council district lines to create six majority black
districts after an earlier plan would have made it difficult for blacks to win in any district.
The charter was filed for referendum on April 2, 1962, but on April 18 some opponents
filed a suit in chancery court claiming the charter and enabling legislative act were
unconstitutional. These opponents included Robert Lillard, the mayor of Belle Meade, and the
former commissioner of Forest Hills. Their attempt was unsuccessful (Hawkins 1966).
In the 1962 campaign, the opposition was led by Nashville Mayor Ben West. West had a
strong political machine from which to rally opponents in the city. Proponents emphasized the
possibility of further annexation and also tried to portray the city government as bloated and
corrupt. Opponents said Metro's promises would be hard to keep and that it would not end
"duplication, overlapping, and fragmentation" (Hawkins 1966, p. 89). Among key proponents
were the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, members of the Charter
Commission, the Council of Jewish Women, the Nashville Tennessean, the Davidson County
Association of Fire and Police Departments, the Citizens Committee for Better Government, the
Tennessee Taxpayers Association, County Judge Beverly Briley, the Nashville Vice-Mayor, some
labor leaders, and "Negro intellectuals," among others. Key opponents included members of
Nashville fire and police departments, officials in small cities, the Nashville Building and Trades
Council, the Nashville Banner, Mayor Ben West, and "Negro traditionalists" (Hawkins 1966).
In terms of black support and opposition to Metro, "Negro traditionalists" and "Negro
intellectuals" are distinguished as follows:
The terms 'traditionalists' and 'intellectuals' are used here solely for classificatory
purposes and to illustrate the different approaches each group takes toward
politics. No pejorative connotations are intended by the author. Thus the latter
term is used simply because the group has a high percentage of university
professors. The 'traditionalists' presumably view Negro political progress in
much the same way that traditional ward politicians view progress-in terms of
job-giving public projects in their districts. The newer 'intellectuals,' on the other
hand, are supposed to have a much broader view of Negro progress. They think
of expanding Negro political, educational, and employment opportunities in
almost every sphere, and at least on a statewide basis (Hawkins 1966, p. 91).
Fisk University and Meharry Medical College were traditionally-black colleges located in
Nashville. Some of their professors, including Vivian Henderson of Fisk, were proponents of
Metro. Other prominent intellectuals included the president of the NAACP, attorney Avon
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Williams, and Z. Alexander Looby.
Professor Henderson was probably the most active of this group. In addition to
his television appearance, he spoke to a number of gatherings sponsored by the
CCBG and affiliated organizations. His theme-indeed the theme of most of this
group-was that Metro was really a question of good government versus
antiquated government. Metro, he felt, was in the interest of a better community,
without whose growth all would suffer. Considerations of this sort, many argued,
took precedence over the fact that consolidation would dilute the voting power of
the Negro community (Hawkins 1966, p. 97).
In terms of black opposition, Hawkins offers these comments on the traditionalists:
[L]arge numbers of 'traditionalist' Negroes, led by City Councilman Robert Lillard,
looked upon Metro as a dilution of their voting strength. Lillard used his own
organization to combat Metro and to stress this undesirable future. According to
Lillard himself, his organization sent out in his district some three thousand
mimeographed leaflets stressing the loss of Negro voting strength under Metro.
Similar leaflets were distributed in other districts by Negro Boy Scouts under the
direction of the Davidson County Democratic League. In addition Lillard made
frequent personal appearances, often to debate Metro proponents." (Hawkins
1966, p. 101).
The Davidson County Democratic League was a black organization set up to increase
black voter registration. It later publicly opposed consolidation.
In discussing the racial variable in terms of Metro support, Hawkins (1966) cites an
unpublished 1962 research paper by Boardman Stewart of the Political Science Department at
Vanderbilt University. According to Hawkins, Stewart
determined the percentage of nonwhites in each of the city's forty-two precincts.
Inasmuch as census tract boundaries do not coincide with precinct boundaries in
Nashville, this was almost a Herculean task. Briefly, Stewart's procedure was to
fit the census data (white and nonwhite), presented block by block in terms of
census tracts, into the precincts. This in turn involved a good deal of field work to
determine exact boundaries. His procedure disclosed that thirteen precincts, all
in the old City of Nashville, had a majority of 'nonwhites.' The per cent of
nonwhites varied from 57.9 to 98.9. The vote in these precincts (using planning
commission data) compared with that in the remainder of the precincts in the old
city ... Only two precincts with a nonwhite majority supported Metro. Both were in
the councilmanic district of Z. Alexander Looby ... ln striking contrast, the three
precincts in Councilman Robert Lillard's district returned pro-Metro votes of only
32, 21, and 39 percent. The reader will recall that a majority of Negro voters also
voted against consolidation in 1958. Only one of Looby's precincts was in the
yes column in 1958, and none of Lillard's was (Hawkins 1966, p. 132-133).
Hawkins comments that the voting dilution message must have reached significant
numbers of blacks and that the low educational level of blacks may have also been a factor
because of the difficulty in understanding the "complex issue" of consolidation.
Stewart's paper was his master's thesis, which was never completed and was
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subsequently lost. 7
Vanderbilt University Political Science honors student Peter Moody (1965) describes four
black politicians, eac;;h representative of a "type." "Good Jelly" Jones is called an Uncle Tom,
Robert Lillard a machine boss, Z. Alexander Looby a black intellectual without an organization,
and Avon Williams a "rather militant person who is president of an effective political organization
of militant Negroes" (p. 46).
Lillard is described as a "true Negro boss." Lillard led the Davidson County Democratic
League (DCDL) and had ties to Mayor Ben West and the old city machine. West Indies native
Looby was a "life-long Republican." Looby was well-liked, probably the most respected member
of the Negro community" (Moody 1965, p. 48-49). Avon Williams, Looby's junior law partner,
headed the Davidson County Independent Political Council (DCIPC). The DCIPC was a
progressive organization that dreamed of building a coalition of blacks, labor, and poor whites.
The DCDL and the DCIPC represented two "contending" factions of black politics in
Nashville. "If the DCDL is a group of professional politicians organized to practice professional
politics, the DCIPC is a group of middle class Negroes organized to raise the status of the Negro
through political action ... " (Moody 1965, p. 50).
Nashville showed characteristics of both northern and southern politics, which made the
situation for blacks mixed. "In Nashville there exists a highly articulate Negro middle class. In the
North such a class is ineffective because of class antagonism-the middle class cannot relate to
the rest of the Negro community. In the South, however, this line is blurred, perhaps because of
the greater amount of overt color prejudice" (Moody 1965, p. 52).

POST-CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION
Voters in Nashville and Davidson County approved consolidation with a dual majority in
August 1962. Five blacks were elected to the first Metropolitan Council in Nashville in November
1962: Alexander Looby, Robert Lillard, Harold Love, John Driver, and Mansfield Douglas. Looby
and Lillard had served since 1951. Love had been elected to city council in a special election in

7

Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005.
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1961 following annexation (Scott 1964). A white woman with family ties to the black community,
was the sixth council member from the majority black districts (Moody 1965).
How did blacks feel about Metro? One would have expected them to oppose it given the
population dilution. Blacks comprised 19.22 percent of Davidson County, but one-third of
Nashville prior to the annexations. However, blacks were split on Metro along factional lines.
Lillard opposed it. Looby supported it. Many politically active blacks, particularly those involved
with the DCIPC (though the DCIPC took no official position), felt the plan was inevitable and that
they should be on the winning side. Williams and the DCIPC used the issue of potential vote
dilution as a catalyst to register more black voters once the plan passed (Moody 1965).
Mansfield Douglas, a black man elected to the first metro council, said he believed that
many blacks voted for consolidation in 1962 as a way to "get back at" Mayor Ben West for his
decision to close city swimming pools out of fear of racial confrontations (Bucy 1995).
Moody (1965) reviews findings from a survey conducted by Vanderbilt University
professor Daniel Grant in 1964. Forty-one blacks, 16 percent of the random sample of Davidson
County registered voters, were included. In terms of who most benefited from Metro's adoption,
1.8% of whites and 4.8% of blacks said blacks did. Interestingly, 4.8 percent of blacks also felt
blacks were "harmed most" though no whites did. Results may have been biased, particularly
those for blacks, since whites interviewers were asking the survey questions.
Moody (1965) claims that blacks were able to use "concurrent voting," working in alliance
with other groups, to maintain their political strength. With one exception (1962 mayoral
election), he notes that DCIPC candidates carried the county. The DCIPC aligned itself with the
metro machine, distinct from the old city machine. Perhaps, too, the DCIPC's post- Metro efforts
to register blacks helped to mitigate the voting strength dilution resulting from joining "lily white"
outlying Davidson County with the black population concentrated in the central city.
However, others believe that the lot of blacks did not improve with Metro. Fate Thomas,
a political organizer who worked in the Criminal Court Clerk's Office when Nashville consolidated
and later became long-time sheriff of the consolidated government, felt consolidation ultimately
hurt the black community. lin an interview with Carole Bucy, he referred to the size of the black
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voting population being 29 percent but that a black councilman-at-Iarge had never been elected
(Sucy 1995).
Mansfield Douglas, a black member of the first metropolitan council, also felt that
consolidation did not help blacks.
'Frankly, I never did have a lot of enthusiasm for consolidation the governments
because it would diminish the percentage of the minority population and would
place the interests of minorities at a disadvantage and I think that it did that.
Metropolitan government has provided the ability to make significant progress
economically. I don't think that minorities have necessarily shared in that
progress in terms of what it has been able to achieve ... ' (Sucy 1995, p 2 of
Douglas interview transcript).

38

CHAPTER IV
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

Race was a major ilssue in the push for consolidation in Nashville. The black community
was divided in its support, organized into two distinct factions. This chapter examines black voter
turnout in the two mayoral elections prior to consolidation and the three mayoral elections
following the consolidation and finds an increase in turnout following the consolidation. Moreover,
a brief comparison to unconsolidated Memphis is included, along with some possible
explanations for changes in participation levels.

Data and availability issues,
Nashville voter reglistration data for the study years were generally unavailable at any unit
smaller than the city. Moreover, voter turnout data on a precinct or even representative-district
level were not available for all years from the local elections commission or other government
archives. In some cases, voter data published in newspapers had to be consulted as a data
source.
Furthermore, the lack of detailed maps at a precinct level for post-consolidation years
meant that representative-district units, rather than precincts, had to be matched to Census
tracts.8 Council districts consist of multiple precincts. Finally, contrary to the case in
Jacksonville, where Census and electoral geographic boundaries were more closely aligned,
many of Nashville's majority black tracts both split precincts with other tracts and are split among
precincts in pre-consolidation years as well as split council districts with other tracts in postconsolidation years. However, no tracts are actually split among wards prior to consolidation and

Pre-consolidation maps on file at Nashville-Davidson County Metro Archives. Metro council district map
as published in 1962.
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relatively few tracts are split among council districts post-consolidation; that is, majority-black
tracts tend to fall entirely within one ward or district, though they may constitute less than 100% of
the district boundary.

9

With detailed maps generally unavailable and geo-coding altogether unavailable, the
matches of Census tract geography to electoral boundaries was achieved primarily through close
eye-level scrutiny of large-scale electoral maps and smaller Census tract maps, but, in a few
cases, it was achieved through electronic scanning and image layering of tract and election
precinct/district maps. Therefore, analysis will lack some precision. Figure 4.1 shows an example
of eye-level matching of Census and electoral geography in Nashville. The 1966 electoral map
was a large poster size in its original form that was photocopied in small sections and stitched
together. Census tract street boundaries were then hand-drawn on the map. Appendix A
discusses the technique for electronic matching.
A lack of precision also stems from the fact that tracts split precincts/districts with other
tracts and often comprise

IE~SS

than an entire district. Fortunately, in many cases, the splits occur

with other majority-black tracts because the patterns of residential segregation by race mean the
bulk of black tracts are contiguous. Therefore, "supertract" groups of majority-black tracts can be
analyzed for a higher degree of precision. Otherwise, one must accept the caveat that voters had
to be assigned to Census tracts based on an estimate of the tract's geographic composition of a
precinct or district.

Nashville data
Voters approved the consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County in a June 1962
referendum. The new metropolitan government took effect in April 1963, with the election for
metropolitan officials taking place in November 1962. Mayoral elections immediately prior to and
following the June 1962 consolidation approval were held in Nashville in 1955, 1959, 1962, 1966,
and 1971. The year 1951 is also notable, particularly in terms of black voting interest. In that
year, at least one black was assured a seat since there were no white

9

In 1962 and 1966, only three majority black tracts wcrc split betwecn two council districts. In 1971, only
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Figure 4.1
1966 Nashville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts

candidates in the first district of the city's Fifth Ward and this was the first time that district
members were voted upon solely by residents of the district instead of all districts within a ward

(Nashville Banner, 9 May 1951, Nashville voters have three election choices) . Moreover, it was
the first local election since 1871 to be held without a poll tax (Nashville Tennessean, 1 March
1951 , City's may vote to be tax free). However, another new law requiring all registered voters to
vote in the precinct in which they reside caused some confusion , especially when thousands of
voters were mailed cards advising them of new polling places only two days prior to the May 10,
1951 election (Nashville Tennessean, 9 May 1951, 10,500 get notices of new voting places) .
Nevertheless , two blacks, Alexander Looby and Robert Lillard , were elected to the Nashville City

one such tract was split.
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Council in 1951, Looby in the initial election and Lillard in the May 24 run-off election.
During the 1950s, there were ten Census tracts in Nashville with a black population over
50 percent: 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 19,24, 26, and 27. All but Tract 26 had a black population over 70
percent. In the 1960s, there were twelve majority black tracts: all those from 1950 plus tracts 25
and 35. All but Tract 35 had a black population over 70 percent, though its percentage, 69.67
percent, could be rounded to the 70 percent cut-off criterion employed for this analysis. Following
the 1970 Census and the consolidation, tracts were renumbered. In 1970, there were 18 tracts in
Nashville-Davidson County with a black population over 50 percent: 118, 119, 127, 136, 137,
138,139,140,141,142,143,144,148,160,162,163,170, and 171. All but tracts 140 and 171
had black population proportions over 70 percent. Moreover, all but 127 and 171 appear to fall
within the former city boundary.

Table 4.1
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County,
1950-1960
Tract
3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
25
26
27

1950 Percent Black
97.53
93.41
96.98
75.90
82.39
81.64
86.02
96.15
Not majority
64.43
99.48

1960 Percent Black
99.09%
98.95%
99.43%
91.01%
89.80%
89.18%
92.63%
98.93%
70.87%
91.30%
99.99%

In the 1955 election, turnout was relatively high compared to previous municipal elections
in Nashville, with 48.45% of registered city voters going to the polls. In that year, almost 24
percent of voters in majority black areas participated. Turnout in black tracts varied widely,
ranging from 10.43 percent to 65.71 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be
extreme outliers since half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout
for all black tracts (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.2
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County, 1970
1970 Percent Black
Tract
75.09%
118
78.24%
119
. 127*
71.47%*
99.00%
136
90.45%
137
99.44%
138
96.37%
139
99.08%
141
98.72%
142
99.35%
143
98.74%
144
97.71%
148
98.76%
160
85.37%
162
91.39%
163
73.11%
170
Note: Tract 127 was located outside former Nashville city boundanes.

Table 4.3
1955 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
26
27

471
786
696
345
479
837
1290
223
1927
619

"Supertracts"
TOTAL 3, 4, 26, & 27
TOTAL 10 and 24

3803
568

15486
2974

24.56%
19.10%

7673

32352

23.72%

TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

Total Voted

Tract Level
Turnout
10.43%
21.87%
18.36%
20.49%
21.92%
22.41%
30.83%
17.27%
65.71%
13.94%

1950 Voting Age
Population
4517
3594
3790
1683
2185
3733
4184
1291
2932
4443

Tract
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Election turnout in 1959 showed a drop-off among blacks, from 23.72 to 16.65 percent.
Although voter registration for Nashville's entire city was unavailable for 1959, it is apparent that
overall voting levels-and likely overall turnout-also dropped; a total of 32,943 voters
participated city-wide in the 1955 mayoral election, while only 24,287 participated in 1959. 10
Turnout in the black tracts ranged from 6.12 percent to 33.77 percent, which was a smaller range
than in 1955 (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4
1959 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
26
27
"Supertracts"
3, 4, 26, and 27
10 and 24
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

Tract Level Turnout

395
395
232
210
573
479
647
210
990
1254

1950 Voting Age
Population
4517
3594
3790
1683
2185
3733
4184
1291
2932
4443

3034
420

15486
2974

19.59%
14.12%

5385

32352

16.65%

8.75%
11.00%
6.12%
12.48%
26.22%
12.83%
15.45%
16.27%
33.77%
28.21%

The first election for the new metropolitan mayor and council was held in November 1962
following the June 1962 referendum approval by voters. Turnout among blacks in 1962 was
higher than in 1955, but still considerably lower than overall turnout, at 21.93 percent compared
to over 63 percent in Nashville-Davidson County. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 12.80
percent to 41.75 percent, although over half of the tracts were within a few percentage points of
the total turnout for all black tracts (see Table 4.5).
The 1966 metropolitan election was historically significant because it was the first time

10

Nashville Banner (1955, May 13). Vote in citywide races. Nashville Tennessean (1959, May 15). Vote
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that there was a run-off in the mayoral election. Given that interest, in addition to this being the
first election for municipal offices following the passage of civil rights and voting rights legislation,
one might have expected a notable increase in black turnout. Yet, turnout in the majority black
tracts was merely 22.25 percent, only fractionally higher than 1962 turnout. Overall turnout did
decrease from over 63 percent in 1962 to 58.10 percent in the 1966 run-off election in which the
mayor's race was decided. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 10.86 percent to 39.39 percent,
but over half tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the total turnout for all black
tracts (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.5
1962 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
25
26
27
"Supertracts"
3, 4, 25, and 27
5,10, and 24
11 and 16
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

Tract Level Turnout

876
730
323
323
642
642
423
323
329
888
1033

1960 Voting Age
Population
3962
3375
2008
908
1760
3261
3303
774
949
3217
5966

2968
969
1284

14252
3690
5021

20.83%
26.26%
25.57%

6943

31662

21.93%

22.11
21.61
16.09
35.59
36.45
19.67
12.80
41.75
34.67
27.59
17.32

In 1971, overall voter turnout in the election for mayor fell to 56.08 percent. However,
voter turnout in majority black tracts soared to approximately 37 percent. The figure is also
approximately 37 percent when the 70 percent majority black tract that fell mostly outside of the
former city boundary, Tract 127, is excluded. This finding is contrary to expectations that black

by precincts.
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turnout would have decreased following consolidation, particularly since overall turnout also

Table 4.6
1966 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
25
26
27
"Supertracts"
3, 4, 25, and 27
5,10, and 24
11 and 16
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

Tract Level Turnout

931
804
252
252
693
693
359
252
305
961
1121

1960 Voting Age
Population
3962
3375
2008
908
1760
3261
3303
774
949
3217
5966

3161
756
1386

14252
3690
5021

22.18%
20.49%
27.60%

7045

31662

22.25%

23.50%
23.82%
12.57%
27.79%
39.39%
21.26%
10.86%
32.60%
32.11%
29.86%
18.79%

decreased. Some factors to consider are that Census tracts were redrawn and completely
renumbered following the 1970 Census. Moreover, Nashville Metro council districts were also
redrawn following the 1970 Census according to the charter's requirement. There were more
black tracts in 1971 following the 1970 census, and the turnout between black tracts ranged
widely, from 15.48 to 69.25 percent (see Table 4.7).
Boardman Stewart" who wrote a Vanderbilt University paper on black support of Metro,
recalled in a 2005 telephone interview that "if it was a racially-defined election, then blacks turned
out; if not, they didn't".11
In the 1971 election, segregationist candidate Casey Jenkins was squaring off against
incumbent Beverly Briley in the runoff election. The two had been narrowed from an initial field of
nine candidates in the first election. Jenkins had made concerns about busing a hot-button issue

II

Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005.
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(Nashville Tennessean, 7 August 1971).12 Jenkins's candidacy and strong showing in the earlier
election may have served to rally black voters.

Table 4.7
1971 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

Tract Level Turnout

1287
427
2521
1541
1884
471
785
443
534
534
1290
785
524
984
984
984

1970 Voting Age
Population
2981
1898
3640
6400
4103
1789
2293
881
3450
2642
2575
2408
1730
2188
2033
2781

118
119
127*
136
137
138
139
141
142
143
144
148
160
162
163
170
"Supertracts"
118 and 119
137,138, and 139
141-144
162,163, and 170
148 and 160

1714
3140
2801
2952
1309

4879
14585
9548
7002
4138

35.13%
21.53%
29.34%
42.16%
31.63%

TOTAL ALL
43792
16200
BLACK TRACTS
Note: Tract 127 was located outside the former NashVille city boundary.

43.17%
22.51%
69.25%
24.08%
45.92%
26.33%
34.23%
50.28%
15.48%
20.21%
50.08%
32.62%
30.27%
44.98%
48.40%
35.39%

36.99%

Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was not
available for all of the study years, although a trend of increase over time can be seen in Figure 1.
In 1955, overall turnout was approximately 48.45 percent.

13

Turnout data were not available for

1959 and 1962 from either local government or newspaper sources. In 1966 and 1971, turnout

Editorial appearing in the Nashville Tennessean, 7 August 1971.
1955 overall turnout figure based on Nashville Banner accounts published in table on May 13, 1955 and
in article: Hatcher, 1. (1955, May 12). Only V2 voters expected to go to polls today. Nashville Banner, At.
12

13
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approached 60 percent, at 58.10 and 59.00 percent respectively. Runoff election contests for
mayor were held for the first time in 1966 and again in 1971 . Turnout was essentially the same
for both the initial and runoff elections in both of those years.
With the exception of the seven percentage point decrease between the 1955 pnd 1959
elections, black voter turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over the study period until the 1971
election . There was virtually no increase in black voter turnout-less than half a percent-between the 1962 and 1966 elections, when one might have expected black participation to have
increased following the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It is still possible that the legislation might have
increased black turnout. Because turnout data for all Nashville city voters was unavailable for
1962, it is a possibility that turnout decreased for all voters between 1962 and 1966, but that
voting rights legislation stimulated black turnout to keep it level. Figure 4.1 illustrates turnout
trends over time , while Table 4.8 lists the figures .

Figure 4.2
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Table 4.8
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Nashville
Year

Black Turnout

Overall Turnout

1955

23.7%

48.5%

1959

16.7%

nfa

1962

21.9%

nfa

1966

22.3%

58.1%

1971

37.0%

59.0%

Unconsolidated Memphis as a Comparison
Because Nashville consolidated not long before passage of the Civil Rights Act and
Voting Rights Act, new rights for blacks may have increased political participation of blacks,
particularly voting participation, and especially in the election years immediately prior to and
subsequent to the legislation. Unconsolidated Memphis makes an ideal control in terms of
checking for possible effects in Nashville because both are in the same state, both have
considerable black popUlations-though Memphis's is much larger-and both have considered
consolidation.
In Memphis, black political organization was stronger than in Nashville and other large
Tennessee cities in the early 1900s, but weakened from the 1920s through the 1960s:
Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County between 1900 and 1925, during the first
part of the [1900-1965] period were more aggressive in politics and governmental
affairs than were Negroes in Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. Through the
efforts of the late Robert (Bob) Church, Waymon Wilkerson, LeRoy McCoy, J. T.
Settles, and Bert M. Roddy in organizing the Lincoln Leagues, Negroes in
Memphis and Shelby County became a dynamic and potent force in political
affairs in Shelby County during the period ... During the latter part of the period,
1925 through 1965, Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County lost most of the
political aggressiveness that was once generated among the Negro voters during
the period from 1900 to 1925 (Scott 1964, p.117).
According to Scott (1964), black voter apathy was apparent when black insurance
executive Dr. J. E. Walker ran for the Memphis City Board of Education in 1951 and was defeated
handily. Walker received only 7,433 votes, under eight percent of all votes cast although blacks
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comprised nearly 19 percent of registered voters.

In 1955, another black candidate, Rev. Roy

Love, also ran for the school board, but received 19,501 votes, over 260 percent the number
Walker had received four years prior, signaling possible growing black political will (Scott 1964).
Others, however, paint a different picture of black political participation in Memphis.
Black voter registration and participation in Memphis was already relatively high in the
1940s and 1950s, perhaps due in large part to the powerful Edward Crump political machine,
which relied heavily on blacks and foreign-born residents, populations with which it could trade
favors and exploit, for its power base (Tucker 1980). Large gains in black registration were also
seen in the 1950s. A 77 percent increase between 1951 and 1955 brought the number of
registered blacks to 39,000. Blacks represented about 25 percent of all registered voters while
comprising around 37 percent of the population. By 1959, over 57,000 blacks were registered to
vote, representing one-third of all registered voters, bringing that figure close to proportionate with
their population percentage (Silver and Moeser 1995).
In 1951, approximately one-third of registered blacks in Memphis voted in the local
election. Voter turnout of Memphis blacks in local elections tended to hover in the 30 to 40
percent range until 1959 (Silver and Moeser 1995). The Crump Machine had collapsed in 1954
with Crump's death. Although he had given some civil service jobs to blacks, segregationist
Crump had not picked any blacks to run for local office (Tucker 1980). In the 1959 mayoral
election, however, five blacks were running for local offices, including public works commissioner,
at which the strongest chance of a black winning local office was seen. Stakes were high, as no
black had been elected to local office since 1879. Black voter turnout was an astonishing 63
percent, though white turnout was also "substantial" (Wright 1993). In 1963, black turnout could
be estimated as being at least 50 percent.'4 In that year, a very close race for Division 3 City
Judge pitted popular black attorney and minister Benjamin Hooks against white candidate Ray

14 Estimate based on the two Memphis Press-Scimitar articles, one stating that there were 69,697 blacks
registered to vote and the other stating that "about 35,000" of the votes for Hooks were "negro votes."
Porteous. C. (4 November 1963). Farris, Hinds each predicts '65,000 will vote for me.' Memphis PressScimitar, page 21; Porteous, C. (8 November 1963). City Hall will have a new look: three are new on 5man commission. Memphis Press-Scimitar, page 1.
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Churchill. The story was even picked up by the New York Times.

15

Despite continued gains in

black registration, black turnout had fallen to 39 percent, compared to 66 percent for whites, in
the 1967 Memphis mayoral general election despite the fact that a black candidate was running
for mayor (Wright 1993). Run-off election data were not considerably different: 40 percent for
blacks and 60 percent for whites. Wright (2000) attributes lower 1967 turnout and apparent black
apathy to the fact that highly-popular segregationist candidate and former mayor Henry Loeb, Jr.
was running and the perception that the black candidate, A. W. Willis, was not strong.
Consequently, blacks gave more of their support to William Ingram, the most "black-friendly" of
the other white candidates. In 1975, black turnout in the general mayoral election was 36 percent
compared to 64 percent for whites, although run-off turnout was 56.5 and 59.1 percent
respectively (Wright 1993).
Figure 4.3
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What can be gleaned from black voting participation in unconsolidated Memphis in regard
to the possible impact of the Voting Rights Act upon partiCipation in consolidated Nashville? One
might have expected black participation in Memphis to have increased following voting rights
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New York Times (8 November 1963). Negro in Memphis loses in close vote. Reprinted from New York

51

legislation; however, the opposite was true, at least in terms of municipal races. Figure 4.2
depicts black voter turnout in Memphis. In Nashville, black voter participation was generally
unchanged in the election immediately following the Voting Rights Act but jumped nearly 50
percent for the next election. Although there may be some error due to limitations on data
availability, in both cases, the trends and particular circumstances suggest that other exogenous
factors, such as particular issues and candidates (as in the case of 1971 with segregationist
candidate Casey Jenkins), in the election(s) played a stronger role.

Socioeconomic Factors
The wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election years also lends itself to
further analysis. It is possible that election-specific factors played a role, such as the race in a
particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and higher turnout numbers seem to be
concentrated in some of the same areas over time suggests that voter characteristics might play
a role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts might explain some of the
difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty
levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in
black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed.
The Census reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by
age groups was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years,
could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the
poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line
was established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census.
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would
increase. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system
and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table.
Measured in terms of years of education for the population 25 and older, the data are somewhat
contrary to expectations. In 1955, for example, the two traces with the most highly-educated

Times online archive service.
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residents had the lowest turnout rates, though several in the middle of the education range were
also in the middle of the turnout range. In 1959, 1962, and 1966, the data were also mixed with
some exceptional extremes but mostly middling tendencies (see Table 4.9). Though it is not
included in the table, the same is true for 1971. Overall, however, educational attainment might
not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts.
It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income was

measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of city median household
income. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system
and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table.
Although there were some mixed results, in all years, including 1971, the highest income levels
had the highest turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 4.10). Overall,
however, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple exceptions to the
expectations, it appears that income may not explain much of the difference among turnout in
black tracts.

Table 4.9
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville 1955 - 1966

Tract

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
25
26
27

Years
Education
1950
9
8
7.4
7.5
8.4
7.2
7.6
6.2

Turnout
1955

Turnout
1959

10.43%
21.87%
18.36%
20.49%
21.92%
22.41%
30.83%
17.27%

8.75%
11.00%
6.12%
12.48%
26.22%
12.83%
15.45%
16.27%

*

*

*

7.6
9.7

65.71%
13.94%

33.77%
28.21%
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Years
Education
1960
8.9
8.5
6.9
8
8.8
7.9
8
7.6
7.8
8.6
10.2

Turnout
1962
22.11%
21.61%
16.09%
35.59%
36.45%
19.67%
12.80%
41.75%
34.67%
27.59%
17.32%

Turnout
1966
23.50%
23.82%
12.57%
27.79%
39.39%
21.26%
10.86%
32.60%
32.11%
29.86%
18.79%

Table 4.10
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and
Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966
Tract

3
4
5
10
11

16
19
24
25
26
27

Household
Income, %
of Area,
1949
62.67%
59.84%
56.49%
60.84%
92.98%
74.19%
65.29%
60.00%

Turnout
1955

10.43%
21.87%
18.36%
20.49%
21.92%
22.41%
30.83%
17.27%

Turnout
1959

8.75%
11.00%
6.12%
12.48%
26.22%
12.83%
15.45%
16.27%

*

*

*

97.02%
44.03%

65.71%
13.94%

33.77%
28.21%

Household
Income, %
of Area,
1959
55.02%
58.31%
65.24%
66.27%
73.60%
73.53%
65.90%
55.72%
54.09%
91.71%
39.28%

Turnout
1962

22.11%
21.61%
16.09%
35.59%
36.45%
19.67%
12.80%
41.75%
34.67%
27.59%
17.32%

Turnout
1966

23.50%
23.82%
12.57%
27.79%
39.39%
21.26%
10.86%
32.60%
32.11%
29.86%
18.79%

Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with
turnout over the years. In 1955, some of the tracts with highest homeownership rates had the
lowest turnout rates, counter to the hypothesis that homeownership and voting participation are
directly correlated. There were more direct correlations in 1959. Data were mostly mixed in 1962
and 1966 (see Table 4.11). The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract
numbering system and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable
across the table. Although it is not included in the table, 1971 showed mostly mixed results as
well. Although the tract with the highest homeowners hip rate also had the highest turnout, some
of the lowest in terms of homeownership showed some of the highest turnout rates. Therefore,
tenure may not be very useful in explaining the difference in turnout among black tracts.

Nashville in Summary
Black voting in Nashville did not follow the hypothesized decrease in turnout following the
consolidation of the city of Nashville and Davidson County, at least during the study period.
Rather, there was an upward trend. Table 4.12 outlines change over time and possible factors.
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Table 4.11
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966
Tract

Percent
Owned
1950
45.59%
13.42%
16.93%
16.62%
37.05%
31.78%
26.99%
16.53%

3
4
5
10
11
16
19
24
25
26
27

Turnout
1955
10.43%
21.87%
18.36%
20.49%
21.92%
22.41%
30.83%
17.27%

Turnout
1959
8.75%
11.00%
6.12%
12.48%
26.22%
12.83%
15.45%
16.27%

*

*

*

51.32%
55.62%

65.71%
13.94%

33.77%
28.21%

Percent
Owned
1960
40.07%
9.74%
21.68%
19.79%
38.82%
28.87%
24.19%
17.20%
32.68%
63.85%
40.86%

Turnout
1962
22.11%
21.61%
16,09%
35.59%
36.45%
19.67%
12.80%
41.75%
34.67%
27.59%
17.32%

Turnout
1966
23.50%
23.82%
12.57%
27.79%
39.39%
21.26%
10.86%
32.60%
32.11%
29.86%
18.79%

Table 4.12
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Explanations
Time Period
1955-1959

Change
-7 percent

1959-1962

+5.2 percent

1962-1966

+0.4 percent

1966-1971

+14.7 percent

Factors/Notes
lack of interest among total
population; overall voting
also down
Possible "first blush effect"
of consolidation
Virtually unchanged; nothing
of note
Segregationist candidate for
Mayor rallies black voters

A five percent increase was seen in the first election involving the mayoral race (1962)
following the merger. Since there was virtually no change between the1962 election and 1966, it
is possible that the 1962 election was a sort of "first blush" effect from the consolidation, with
public interest in the "new" government. The lack of a decrease in the next election might be
attributable to effects of civil rights and voting rights legislation keeping turnout level when it might
have decreased. However, there was a large increase, nearly 15 percent, among black voters in
the next election. Since general turnout was virtually unchanged, it seems that some racial factor
was at play.
Unconsolidated Memphis was utilized as a comparison to check for possible effects of
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the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act, both passed shortly after the Nashville consolidation,
upon black voter turnout in Nashville. Since Memphis actually saw a decrease in black voter
turnout in the same time period-pre- and post-Voting Rights Act--other factors may have had a
stronger effect on black turnout in Nashville. In the case of the large jump in turnout between
1966 and 1971, contextual analysis makes a case for interest in the mayoral race, in which an
outspoken segregationist was running for mayor. The candidacy and campaign of segregationist
Casey Jenkins may have served to rally black voters and drive them to the polls in Significantly
increased numbers.
In terms of the differences in turnout among black voting districts, the socioeconomic
variables examined did not consistently explain variations. There were some correlations
between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively. However, many notable
exceptions to expectations make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political,
such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.
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CHAPTER V.
JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY BACKGROUND

Jacksonville was the second of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A
1967 public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local
government through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks
comprised over 40 percent of the city's population (with some projections that the city was well on
its way to becoming majority-black), and the support of the black community was considered
es·sential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and
representation in Jacksonville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and
the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power
and participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND JACKSONVILLE GOVERNMENT NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1967
Historically speaking, Jacksonville could be considered a black city because of its largerthan-average black population percentage. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, blacks were a
majority of the city's population. In the 1930s and 1940s, blacks comprised over one-third of
Jacksonville's residents. By 1960, over 40 percent of the population was black. Although the city
consolidated with the county in 1968 following a 1967 referendum, the old city boundaries had a
population that was over 47 percent black in 1970. Even after Jacksonville's physical area and
population increased with its consolidation with mostly white Duval County, blacks still comprised
about 28 percent of the entire Duval County population in 2000, with the largest concentrations of
that population remaining within the inner city census tracts.
Between 1865 and 1907, 13 blacks were elected to local offices in Jacksonville. There
were also 16 blacks elected from Jacksonville to serve in the Florida state legislature during the
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1865-1900 period (Bartley 2000).
Racist backlash to black political participation followed in the early 1900s. White
Democrats began using tactics such as purging blacks from registration lists, employing a white
primary, levying poll taxes and otherwise circumventing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Bartley (2000) notes that the white tactics led to a 69 percent decrease in black
voting in Florida and that no blacks in Jacksonville were elected to local office for sixty years,

from 1907 until 1967. Moreover, the state legislature mandated at-large voting in Jacksonville,
which made it difficult for black voters to elect black candidates. Even though there was a wardbased representation system, the ward representatives were elected at-large (Bartley 2000).
Blacks had identified with the Republican Party in the 1800s and early 1900s; that was
Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party. They started identifying more closely with the Democratic
Party after the New Deal. Post-World War II, the white Democrats in Florida rewrote party
membership guidelines to exclude blacks. This procedure was actually upheld by the Supreme
Court in Grovey v. Townsend (1935) due to it being a "private act by private citizens" (Bartley
2000).
In 1946, blacks were 21 % of Jacksonville's registered voters. Moreover, there were
12,000 black Democrats registered by 1947. Black leaders led drives to register them as
Democrats, in spite of what whites Florida Democratic leaders had previously done. Decisions by
the U.S. Circuit Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held and upheld that blacks must be
allowed to register as Democrats (Bartley 2000).
Jacksonville government underwent a reorganization in 1951. The executive branch
consisted of a stronger chief executive mayor and five-member city commission. The legislative
branch consisted of a nine-member council representing districts but elected at-large. A sevenmember county commission was also elected at-large.
Black candidates entered Jacksonville city council races in 1951 and throughout the
1950s but were unsuccessful. There was some optimism about the 1959 city council elections,
and growing black voting clout served to rally whites. The Florida Times-Union and Jacksonville
Journal newspapers advised whites to turn out to vote. The Times-Union, a "consistent opponent
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of African-American political participation," actually "advised city officials to annex Jacksonville's
surrounding areas to reduce Black political influence" (Bartley 2000, p. 53). This would have
diluted black voting strength by adding 147,000 new white residents.
"Suburban growth also contributed to new political realities. If Whites continued their
flight from Jacksonville, minorities would be left to run the city. The process had almost created
demographic parity as the city council elections approached. In 1940 there were 82,798 Whites
and 28,798 African-Americans in Jacksonville. By 1960, there were 118,286 Whites and 82,525
African-Americans" (Bartley 2000, p. 123).
In 1967, the first black representatives since 1907 were elected to the city council. They
were women: Mary Singleton and Sallye Mathis. They would have to run again the same year for
new seats in new districts for a new council in a consolidated city-county government in which
blacks comprised much less of the population than they had in the former city.

LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION
As has been well documented in the literature, pre-consolidation Jacksonville was
plagued by a host of problems, including the possibility of school disaccreditation, air and water
pollution, sewer capacity issues, inadequate police and fire protection outside city limits, bloated
government budgets and increasing taxes, rising crime rates, slum housing in the city, and more
(Martin 1993; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).
Rapidly shifting residential patterns contributed heavily to the problems. The population
in the county balance increased from 99,512 to 327,000 from 1950 to 1965, a drastic change of
over 228 percent in just 15 years. During the same period, the city population decreased by 3.2
percent-from 204,517 to 198,000-while the budget grew from $23.9 million to $94.8 million, an
increase approaching 300 percent. The city budget, plagued by a winnowing tax base, was
shouldering the burden of rapid growth in the county (Martin 1993).
Because of fiscal strains on the city and county, reformers began looking to alternative
forms of government. Plus, on a more subtle level, concerns about race and political power were
probably also a factor (Swanson 2000).
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In January 1965, the state legislature authorized a 50-citizen committee to study
government in Jacksonville. The Duval County legislative delegation named the members. Four
blacks were appointed to the committee, including Earl Johnson, an attorney who became the
commission's secretary as well as liaison with the black community (Crooks, October 26, 2005 email; Martin 1993).
Annexation was discussed as a possible means to alleviate the fiscal crisis.
Consolidation was thrust to the forefront in 1965 with the "Yates Manifesto," a one-sentence
recommendation from a panel of business and civic leaders convened by Claude Yates. Yates
was a retired vice president of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company in Florida and
had begun serving as president of the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce. The statement called
upon the Duval County delegation of the Florida legislature to prepare an enabling act for Duval
citizens to vote on the consolidation of government within Duval County. (Martin 1993)
The Local Government Study Commission released its report and recommendations in
May 1966. The chairman of the Study Commission, J.J. Daniel, was also a member of the
Florida Publishing Company board of directors. Daniel urged Florida Publishing Company vice
president Robert Feagin to involve the local newspapers in the consolidation campaign. Richard
Martin [author] was contracted to develop and conduct Jacksonville Journal and Jacksonville
Times-Union campaigns to "educate the whole community on the nature of its problems and the
reasons why consolidation was needed to solve them ... " (Martin 1993, p. 97).
Martin (1993) describes a series of legislative events between "Black Hats" and "White
Hats" in the Duval delegation, with the Black Hats opposed to the consolidation plan and
attempting to subtly ensure the failure of the plan with political maneuvering, including trying to
put through the unamended plan, which would likely be rejected by voters. Eventually, a few key
changes, including reducing the consolidated governing body from 21 to 19, with five members
elected at-large and 14 being district-based.
After 18 months, the report Blueprint for Improvement was released with findings and
recommendations, including a consolidated city-county government. Twenty problem areas were
highlighted: "disaccredited schools; significant water and air pollution; high crime rate; loss of
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property values in Jacksonville; inadequate land use patterns; high comparative cost of
government; lack of public confidence in government; low voter registration; economic stagnation;
traffic problems; low wages and a relatively unskilled work force; poor sewage facilities countywide; inadequate water facilities in the outlying areas; poor fire protection in outlying areas;
inefficient sanitation system for outlying areas; an unworkable tax assessment policy; inadequate
prison facilities and parole procedures; inadequate and wasteful governmental purchasing
procedures; huge gaps in library services in outlying areas; and racial unrest" (Bartley 2000, p.
141-142).
Enabling legislation was introduced in mid-1967. The plan originally called for a 21member city council. The figure was later amended to 19, including 14 district-elected members
and five additional council members elected at large. Blacks were in the majority in three
districts.
There was concern that blacks had the most to lose with consolidation, as their political
clout was finally beginning to grow with voting rights and civil rights legislation and their
increasing population percentage in Jacksonville. "In 1967, African-Americans made up over 42
percent of the city's population and held nearly 40 percent of the voting strength. But Blacks held
only two of nine city council seats. Consolidation would dilute Black political strength because it
would be reduced to 28 percent of the total population and 26 percent of the voting strength.
African-Americans would have to accept three districts in a 14-district city run by a 19-member
council. African-Americans virtually abandoned hope of winning any of the five at-large seats to
be created under consolidation (Bartley p. 143)."
Pro-consolidationists argued that at least consolidation gave blacks some guarantee of
representation because of district-based voting. Some blacks said that the bigger picture was
more important that representation, that problems needed to be fixed. Urban League officials and
the NAACP backed consolidation. The Florida Star never took an official position (Crooks 2004).
Since blacks comprised nearly 40 percent of the city's registered voters, black community
leader Clanzel Brown and Councilwoman Sallye Mathis led the drive in the "Negro" areas. Mary
Singleton was opposed to consolidation. Renewed emphasis later had to be given to courting
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black voters when some changes made to proposed council district lines placed Mary Singleton
into the same district as Sallye Mathis. Both were serving as city council members after being
elected earlier in 1967; they were the first blacks to be elected to local offices in decades.
A necessary technical revision to the council district map placed-inadvertently or
intentionally?-Mary Singleton into a district already occupied by Sallye Mathis. Some leaders,
including Wendell Holmes of the NAACP and Sallye Mathis, charged that "Black Hat" legislators
had tried to sabotage the consolidation campaign efforts by upsetting the black community
(Martin 1993).
Pat Caddell, a high school student serving as an aide to Representative Shultz, came up
with a plan that placed the two women in different districts (Crooks 2004; Martin 1993). When
the legislature approved the plan, the Times-Union ran the headline "Negro leaders endorse
consolidation for Duval." The article mentioned Dr. W.W. Schell, vice president of the Greater
Jacksonville Economic Opportunity and president emeritus of the Jacksonville Urban League,
was chairing a group of black leaders campaigning for consolidation.
Mary Singleton continued her opposition, claiming consolidation would reduce black
representation and dilute black voting strength.
"Negroes controlled approximately 40 percent of the Jacksonville vote. Under
consolidation that percentage would be significantly reduced. Furthermore, population trends
showed a shifting of white middle- and upper-class families out of the city and a polarization of
Negroes within the city ... Conversely, there could be no doubt that strong support for
consolidation developed among segments of the white population of Duval County because of a
fear that Negroes might one day control the city government. There were whites who believed
that if this trend continued the city might soon have a Negro mayor" (Martin 1993, p. 156).
Former city official and black community leader Alton Yates commented,
"There was a tremendous fear through the city that Jacksonville was rapidly
becoming a black city. Blacks comprised, I want to think, about 42-44 percent of
the population. It was largely believed that the city was getting close to electing a
black mayor ... But white flight as far as the tax base had already started fleeing to
the suburbs. So, it was very important for the consolidation charter to pass in my
opinion for that reason" (Jacksonville Public Library 2006).
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It was pointed out that with at-large voting, there was no guarantee that white

suburbanites couldn't prevent blacks from winning council seats. Consolidation, its supporters
insisted, would at least guarantee at least 3 of the 14 district-based seats and give blacks an
opportunity to run in the five at-large contests.
Although there were some prominent black leaders supporting consolidation, two black
newspapers opposed it, according to Martin (1993). The Advocate spoke out against it. The

Florida Star, published by Eric Simpson, didn't endorse consolidation editorially, though it
presented both sides (Crooks 2004); Martin apparently considers lack of endorsement to be
opposition. "For many Negroes the choice between the old ways and consolidation wasn't hard
to make. They had only to look around-at the open drainage ditches, the privies, shanties,
unpaved streets, and rundown schools-to make up their minds" (Martin 1993, p. 158). One
major factor in garnering more support, black and white, for consolidation may have been some
local government scandals (Crooks, October 2005 interview). City government corruption was
uncovered by local media in 1965 and 1966. City officials had done such things as purchase
luxury automobiles for city officials on a non-competitive basis, charge personal purchases to city
accounts, and award insurance contracts to friends and political supporters without regard to
pricing or need. (Crooks 2004).
Local television station WJXT helped create support for government reform with its series
of investigative documentaries including one on police department mismanagement and another
called "Government by Gaslight," describing overlapping, confusing layers of local government.
In 1965 a special expose type report uncovered a scandal in the procurement of the city's
automobile fleet. A series on the city's insurance programs aired in 1966, again documenting
possible fraud, and, at the least, gross mismanagement of taxpayers' dollars. WJXT continued
its investigative reporting on "questionable city practices and programs (Martin 1993, p. 75)."
Martin suggests that WJXT's charges prompted Circuit Court Judge Marion W. Gooding to call on
May 17, 1966, for a grand jury investigation. When the grand jury process was completed in
early November, two of the five city commissioners, four of nine city council members, the city
auditor and the recreation chief had been indicted (Martin 1993).
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Scholar Bert Swanson agrees that the Jacksonville reformers' move to professionalize
the government and leave behind the corruption was a key factor, however; "under the surface,
racism was a big factor. There were projections that the city could become half-black as early as
1972. Although the reformers were keyed in on professionalization, they were savvy in playing
up-or at least not doing much to downplay-people's fears, such as racial concerns" (Swanson
interview October 24, 2005).
James Crooks also notes that Louis Ritter, mayor from 1965-67, did not win re-election in
1967 despite popularity and a good relationship with the African American community. Ritter had
appointed the first blacks to city policy-making and advisory boards and agencies. Instead,
Tanzler won on a reform ticket. "White middle-class residents voted for him in substantial
numbers to overcome organized party and African American support for the incumbent" (Crooks
2004 p. 51). In 2006, former mayor Lou Ritter commented in retrospect, "One of the main
reasons why people overwhelmingly voted for consolidation is because they did not want to see a
black man serving as mayor, and it split the community greatly" (Jacksonville Public Library
2006). On August 8,1967, voters in Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida approved a
referendum to consolidate the two governments into one Greater Jacksonville. Elections for
officeholders in the new government were held later that fall, and the new government was
officially installed in October 1968. Over 86,000-86,079---Duval County residents voted.
Consolidation was approved 54,493 to 29,768. Within the city, the vote was 19,534 for, 9,677
against. In the County balance, it was 30,858 and 17,192, respectively.
Perhaps surprisingly, the margin was much closer among blacks than for all voters.
Blacks countywide voted 4,433 for, 3,117 against. In the county balance only, the black vote was
1,487 for, 963 against (Martin 1993).

Almost 65 percent voted for consolidation. Black

Jacksonville had supported it 59 to 41 percent, whereas the whole population of the old city was
in favor nearly 2 to 1 and in Duval County 64 to 36.
"Though critics still remained, the larger community, including both African
Americans and previously reluctant suburbanites, came close to a consensus, a
major accomplishment in a city plagued by racial, economic, educational,
environmental, and political divisions. Still, among the critics were an
undetermined yet substantial number of people who voted against consolidation
for the very reason Mary Singleton feared: the dilution of black political power.
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This fear, that whites intended for consolidation to dilute black Jacksonville's
political power, became a belief among many local African Americans. Historian
Abel A. Bartley describes the fears of Frank Hampton, Mary Singleton, and
newspaper editor Eric Simpson at the time. Almost thirty-five years later,
attorney A. Wellington Barlow and newspaper editor Isiah Williams repeated the
concerns. African American supporters at the time, however, saw a trade-off.
They acknowledged white dominance into the foreseeable future with
consolidation but accepted the half loaf of guaranteed district seats on city
council and the promise of improved urban services so badly needed in the
neglected urban core under the old regime. They also saw the possibility that if
African Americans did become a majority in the future, state legislators might still
annex enough white suburbs to maintain control, without a referendum. As a
result, most black leaders "saw consolidation as the lesser of two evils." (Crooks
2004 p. 57-58).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION

Primary elections were held October 24, 1967. Blacks ran in District 8 (Sallye Mathis),
the old Third Ward; District 7 (Oscar Taylor, "Tank" Tankersly, and Rev. Earnest Newman); and
District 11 (Mary Singleton). Earl Johnson decided to run for an at-large seat. Mathis won
handily and did not face a run-off (held if leading candidate did not receive a majority) or a
Republican in the general election. Tankersly and Taylor had a run-off election, with Taylor
winning. Singleton faced no opposition in the primary. Johnson was able to beat conservative
white candidate Roger West in the run-off. Although voting was "light" for the November 7 run-off
elections-turnout was less than 50 percent-voting was high in the Johnson-West race, with
67,000 of 76,518 voters making a choice in that contest. Johnson won 36,925 to 30,104 (Bartley
p. 149).
In the December 5 general election, only two blacks had Republican opponents, Johnson
and Taylor. However, Taylor, Johnson, Singleton, and Mathis were all elected to the
consolidated city-county government. Bartley notes that "[more] voters cast ballots in the group
five at-large race than in any other council race" (2000, p. 150), which probably had to do with
racial concerns.
Looking back on the pro-consolidation vote, blacks may have felt that they basically had
to choose between power in a declining city or sharing in potential recovery and growth. "In 1968
Johnson explained his support [of consolidation] by saying: " 'The wealth was leaving
Jacksonville. Population as a whole was declining. There just was no good reason why we
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should keep what government we had. The Negro had more to lose by opposing consolidation.
We had to think about what happens to a city all black. Would industry come? Would tourists?
Would it become a citywide slum?' " (Bartley 2000 p. 152).
There was some black opposition to consolidation that continued years afterward. In
1969, local NAACP president Lynwood Lee said Jacksonville was "pussy-footing around" with
urban renewal projects and public housing was among the worst in the South. He added that,
"We are paying city taxes and not getting city benefits" (Martin 1993, p.314, quoting Lee from a
March 22, 1969 Times-Union article).
In an October 1, 1978 Times-Union article by Randolph Pendleton entitled "Has merger
benefited blacks?" Frank Hampton and Eric Simpson claimed that the black position had not
progressed but regressed and that blacks had lost political strength, and thereby economic
power. Earl Johnson, formerly an ardent consolidation supporter, said that he was not sure he
would support it "[k]nowing what I know now." Johnson felt the government efforts to improve
black neighborhoods were not nearly enough, and that resources weren't going there due to
decreased black political strength (Martin 1993). In 1981, Johnson was quoted in the

Jacksonville Journal as saying that "[r]etrospectively, I note a number of towns that did turn Black
and were able to grow as such" (Martin 1993 p.152).
Swanson (interview 2005) agrees that although the consolidation gave blacks some "real
access," in perpetuity they are going to be a minority. Moreover, he believes consolidation has
"created a schizoid polity. There's not much contact between city blacks and suburban whites."
A 1973 study by Joan Carver found that black leaders were not as enthusiastic as white
leaders, but felt they had "much greater accessibility" than in the past (Crooks 2004). At the 1977
First Conference on Jacksonville History at the University of North Florida, Carver commented
that consolidation's "general thrust had been favorable to the interests of blacks," although she
expressed some reservation (cited by Crooks 2004). Crooks explains:
"On the one hand, black participation throughout government had increased due
to the election of district representatives to city council and the commitment of
top city officials to appoint blacks to positions of responsibility. Blacks were
making white officials aware of black needs. Further, the willingness of the
consolidation government to accept federal dollars provided resources to expand
public health and public housing programs in the black community. On the other

66

hand, consolidated government had little interest in legislating equal job or
housing opportunities. Further, the city's low-tax, low-spend policies meant fewer
social services in the minority community, where they were greatly needed,"
(Crooks 2004 p. 208).

Crooks summarized other black opinion expressed at a 1993 University of North Florida
Humanities Council symposium "Race Relations in Jacksonville Since Consolidation." The event,
organized by Crooks and fellow UNF History professor Carolyn Williams, included eight African
Americans on the panel of 11 participants. Crooks noted: "Jacksonville's African Americans, who
comprised one-quarter of the population, did not see equity or equal opportunity as a
consequence of consolidated government. Twenty-five years later, many blacks still looked for its
benefits."
Black concerns about having a voice in the consolidated government have persisted.
The Jacksonville Community Council Inc. (JCCI) conducts an annual Quality of Ufe in
Jacksonville: Indicators and Progress report in collaboration with the University of North Florida.
Survey data show that Jacksonville residents continue to believe felt racism is a community
problem, with nearly two-thirds of blacks and over half of whites agreeing (JCCI 2002).
Furthermore, a 2000 survey revealed that "far fewer Black respondents believed that local
government gives equal representation to the interests and concerns of all racial and minority
groups ... " (JCCI 2002, p. 10). This same 2002 report also profiled the case of consolidation as
an example of continued racial differences in perceptions of discrimination, noting that "[b]lacks
are more likely to stress white fears about the growing population and political power of blacks in
the pre-consolidated City of Jacksonville as driving the consolidation movement" (p. 9).
More recently, in February 2007, a group called the Jacksonville Leadership Coalition
called for the abolition of consolidated government in Jacksonville to "make city government and
police more responsive to minorities' concerns and needs" (Brumley/Florida Times Union
February 10, 2007).
Swanson (2000) cites Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994): "Electoral participation in
Jacksonville was low and declined after consolidation." Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994)
conducted a time series analysis of electoral participation, 14 years before and 19 years after
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consolidation. They found that turnout in Jacksonville decreased by about 18 percent, which was
more than the decrease in other Florida urban counties.
"Although consolidation tends to favor the core more than the periphery, the
merger in Jacksonville reversed this notion. The black vote was diluted by
consolidation; before the merger, over 40 percent of the population in the inner
city was black, but in the new polity only one-quarter of the population comprised
blacks. Although central-city blacks gained an increased tax base and a degree
of access, representation, and influence, suburban whites continued to dominate
politically." (Swanson 2000)

Crooks said it is "still controversial about why consolidation became such a big issue.
African-Americans said it was to prevent the city from becoming majority-black. Why, then, did
60 percent of blacks vote for consolidation? The population was 42 percent black in 1967 and
was on its way to becoming majority-black in the early 1970s. One reason for support of
consolidation was a county government "powerless" to provide urban services (Crooks interview
Oct 25, 2005). Crooks said, "I personally feel that the consolidation election was strongly
influenced by indictments, particularly as shown on local television exposes. Petty corruption had
not been a big concern, though, before the exposes on the scandals." Equally important factors
were the disaccreditation of the schools and the county's lack of infrastructure following rapid
growth. (Crooks interview Oct 25, 2005).
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CHAPTER VI
JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

Race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in Jacksonville. The black
community was divided in its support, and concerns about racial, political, and social equity under
a consolidated government continue in Jacksonville. This chapter examines voter turnout in the
two elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and three following the
consolidation and finds that turnout did decrease following the consolidation. A brief comparison
to unconsolidated Tampa is included, along with some possible explanations for changes in
participation levels.
Voters approved the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval County in August 1967 and
the new government took effect in 1968. Local elections involving a mayoral race to be
considered in this study include two prior to consolidation, held in 1963 and in the spring of 1967,
and three after consolidation, 1971, 1975, and 1979.
Preliminary research revealed that voter registration data by race were available on a
precinct level in 1963 and in 1968 (which might offer a close approximation for 1967 elections,
though precincts may have changed slightly). Majority black precincts, as indicated by precinctlevel registration by race, had a very low average turnout of 4.4 percent in the 1963 general
election. Conversely, majority black precincts had a turnout of roughly 53% in the 1967 general
election. This dramatic difference led to the question, "Is this difference due to the fact that civil
rights and voting rights legislation post-dated the earlier election, or were there other factors, such
as corruption scandals and the problems with schools and municipal services that created an
interest for voters?" Two questions subsequently arose as a way to gauge the relative impact
federal legislation may have played: Was black turnout considerably lower than overall turnout?
Was black registration also low?
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Voter turnout in Jacksonville and Duval County was characteristically low for many years
preceding consolidation (Blueprint for Improvement 1966). Overall turnout in the 1963 general
election was 12 percent; in 1967, 53 percent. The 1967 overall turnout and black turnout were
basically the same. For 1963, there had been a difference of 7.6 percent, which may not be out
of line with the literature showing turnouts generally being lower for blacks than for whites.
Moreover, registration among blacks, at least according to 1963 and 1968 Duval County
Supervisor of Elections records, was closely in line with blacks' population percentage. Blacks
comprised 33.8 percent of city registered voters in 1963. In 1968, black were 40 percent of city
registered voters and 20 percent of county voters.
If there weren't huge differences in turnout by race and black registration didn't spike
dramatically, it may be safely concluded that the impact of civil rights and voting rights legislation
upon the difference in participation levels between 1963 and 1967 general elections was
relatively minimal. What then, caused the jump from 12 percent to 53 percent in overall voting
turnout? Searches of newspaper archives revealed that mayors were not always necessarily
elected in the general elections in Jacksonville.
Although the original intent in the research design was to look at turnout in general
elections, Jacksonville's unique political environment requires the examination of primary
elections in lieu of general elections for certain years. Because the vast majority of voters in both
Jacksonville and Duval County were registered as Democrats throughout the 1960s and into the
1970s, depending on the number and popularity of candidates, mayors were more or less elected
in the primaries for some years. In 1963, for example, 95.7 percent of registered voters within
Jacksonville city limits were Democrats. That year, the mayor was elected in the first of two
primaries held. In 1968, Democrats still comprised 94.4 percent of city registered voters and over
90 percent of Duval County voters. However, the mayoral election in 1967 was decided in the
general election following an initial primary and a second run-off primary. Table 6.1 profiles voter
registration and turnout and types of elections in which the mayoral winner was decided, for each
of the five election years.

Data for 1971 and after reflect the larger population of the

consolidated city.
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Table 6.1
Voter Registration and Participation Profile
Jacksonville Mayoral Elections 1963-1979

In 1960, there were seven census tracts within the city of Jacksonville that were at least
70% nonwhite; two tracts, 2 and 5, had simple majority-black populations but did not have black
populations over 70 percent black recorded until the 1970 Census. Additionally, there were four
census tracts in Duval County in the Lake Forest-Riverview area (northeast of the city boundary)
that were greater than 70% nonwhite: 107, 114, 115, and 116. In 1970, there were 13 tracts that
were over 70% nonwhite.

16

Although this study is focused on the city of Jacksonville pre- and

post-consolidation, it might be beneficial to include examination of black electoral participation in
those majority-minority tracts outside the former city boundaries areas because the Lake ForestRiverview population represented 25 percent of the nonwhite population in Duval County in 1970
(Florida Publishing Company 1973). However, tracts outside of the former city boundary did not
vote in the city elections in 1963 and 1967. Table 6.2 profiles the population of majority black
Census tracts.
Over the five mayoral election cycles in Jacksonville, two occurring pre-consolidation and
three post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed similar
patterns, though black turnout initially was different. Tables 6.3 through 6.7 offer detailed tractspecific turnout information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 6.1
presents a summary of black and overall turnout over the time period.

16 This figure includes tracts formerly outside city boundaries that became part of the newly-consolidated
city-county.
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Table 6.2
Composition of 70 % Majority Black Tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County
Tract

1960 Percent Black

1970 Percent Black

Pre-consolidated city
boundary
2

54.8%

76.4%

4

94.8%

94.0%

5

54.1%

70.1%

15

99.1%

99.4%

16

99.9%

100.0%

17

100.0%

99.9%

18

98.3%

98.6%

28

84.9%

98.1%

29

100.0%

99.9%

Included in city postconsolidation:
107

74.3%

87.5%

114

95.6%

99.8%

115

84.5%

89.7%

116

98.4%

98.7%

Source: Florida Publishing Company (1973, November). Census tract data of Duval County. Percent nonwhite. Note.
Census data show that the nonwhite population in Jacksonville was almost exclusively black during those years.

For the 1963 election, four of the city's seven majority-minority tracts had precincts that were
split: Tract 15 and Tract 16 shared a precinct, and Tract 17 and Tract 18 split a precinct. The
remaining tracts, 4, 28, and 29, contained precincts which were basically coterminous with tract
boundaries. Any spillover of precinct boundaries was limited to a handful of blocks and/or a
negligible fraction (10% or less) of the precinct area.17 It should be noted that four additional
Duval County tracts-1 07, 114, 115, and 116--immediately outside the city boundary were
majority-minority; however, residents of those tracts were neither represented by nor voted for
city elected officials. For the three city tracts with no split precincts, voter turnout, based on the
total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the voting age population (age
18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 31.27 percent to 40.60 percent. When precincts of tracts
15, 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 26.26 percent for that area.

17 Precinct maps for all five election cycles were obtained from the Duval County Supervisor of Elections
office.

72

For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was approximately 31 .93 percent A summary
is presented in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3
1963 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
TractLevel
Turnout

Tract

Total
Voted

Total 4

1908

1960
Voting
Age
Pop.
4699

Total 15
Total 16
Total 17
Total 18
TOTAL 15,16,17,18 combined

4869

6240
4535
4464
3303
18542

26.26%

Total 28
Total 29

2172
3387

6945
8450

31.27%
40.08%

TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS

12336

38636

31.93%

40.60%

In the 1967 election, three of the seven majority-minority tracts had split precincts: 16, 17,
and 18. Tract 16 shared a precinct with Tract 17. Tract 17 shared two precincts with Tract 18.
When precincts of tracts 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 32.38
percent. Turnout for the four tracts without split precincts ranged from 30.64 percent to 48.45
percent. For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was 37.07 percent. A summary is
presented in Table 6.4.
The 1971 election was the first election to include the office of mayor in the consolidated
government. Although a second 1967 municipal election for local offices was held following the
August consolidation referendum, a new mayor was not elected at that time. In 1971, there was
a total of nine majority-minority tracts within the pre-consolidation city boundary, plus the four
tracts in the county balance, for a total of 13 majority-minority tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County.
In the former city, Tract 2 and Tract 5 were added to the seven majority-minority tracts from the
1960 Census. In 1971, precincts were generally coterminous with tract boundaries, with minimal
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Table 6.4
1967 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
TractLevel
Turnout

Tract

Total
Voted (all
precincts)

Total 4
Total 15

1440
2597

1960
Voting
Age
Pop.
4699
6240

Total 16
Total 17
Total 18
TOTAL 16, 17, 18 combined

3407

4535
4464
3303
12302

32.38%

Total 28
Total 29

2775
4094

6945
8450

39.96%
48.45%

TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS

14313

38606

37.07%

30.64%
41.62%

spillover. Turnout for all tracts in the former city was a combined 36.91 percent, with turnout in
individual tracts ranging from 14.64 to 44.63 percent. Turnout for tracts outside the former city
boundary was 36.86 percent, with individual tract turnout ranging from 24.44 to 46.58 percent.
Turnout for all 13 majority-minority tracts in the county was approximately 36.90 percent. Turnout
levels in the county balance excluded, the former city boundary turnout represents a small
decrease of .08 percent from 1967 levels even though one might anticipate great voter interest in
the election of the first "metro" mayor.
Data for 1971 were re-checked for possible errors. Of the five mayoral election years being
examined, 1971 was the only year in which a complete and contiguous large-scale city and/or
county precinct map was unavailable. Rather, precincts had to be matched with the majorityminority tracts based on a Supervisor of Elections office collection of 8.5 by 11 sheets of maps
containing some hand-drawn precinct boundaries and surrounding areas in addition to some
printed precinct boundaries on street maps. For this analysis, Census tract boundaries were
hand-drawn onto these sheets to determine the tracts into which the precincts fell. Results were
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checked against a Supervisor of Elections office file of precinct boundary changes made in the
1970s as well as a list of polling place addresses for the 1971 election. Moreover, the overall
voting turnout trend also reflected a small decrease between these years, so the black turnout
data are not out-of-line. The 1971 election is summarized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5
1971 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

Tract-Level
Turnout

1146
1153
946
2195
634
617
891
3277
4245

1970
Voting
Age
Pop.
2957
3300
2446
5510
1693
4214
2248
9044
9512

15104

40924

36.91%

1311
1076
931
1717

3667
2310
3810
3866

35.75%
46.58%
24.44%
44.41%

TOT AL CO. BALANCE

5035

13653

36.88%

TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

20139

54577

36.90%

Tract

Total
Voted

Total 2
Total 4
Total 5
Total 15
Total 16
Total 17
Total 18
Total 28
Total 29

TOT AL FORMER CITY
Total
Total
Total
Total

107
114
115
116

38.76%
34.94%
38.68%
39.84%
37.45%
14.64%
39.64%
36.23%
44.63%

For the 1975 election, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that were notably
split with other tracts. Figure 6.1 shows a section of the 1975 map with hand-drawn Census
tracts. Turnout, based on the total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the
voting age population (age 18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 8.35 to 35.83 percent among
the nine central city tracts, whereas the four county tracts ranged from 34.48 to 38.14 percent.
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Voter turnout was 25.56 percent in the former city tracts and 36.32 percent in the county
remainder tracts, with an overall turnout of 28.25 percent, which represents a considerable
decrease from 1971 as well as the 1963 and 1967 turnout levels.

Table 6.6 presents a

summary of the 1975 election.
In 1979, again, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that had major splits with
other tracts. Turnout ranged from 4.15 to 34.25 percent among the nine central city tracts,

Table 6.6
1975 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

TractLevel
Turnout

808
663
525
2123
182
352
223
2207
3376

1970
Voting
Age
Pop.
2957
3300
2446
5510
1693
4214
2248
9044
9512

10459

40924

25.56%

1331
842
1453
1333

3667
2310
3810
3866

36.30%
36.45%
38.14%
34.48%

TOT AL CO BALANCE

4959

13653

36.32%

TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

15418

54577

28.25%

Tract

Total
Voted

Total 2
Total 4
Total 5
Total 15
Total 16
Total 17
Total 18
Total 28
Total 29
TOT AL FORMER CITY
Total
Total
Total
Total

107
114
115
116

27.32%
20.09%
21.46%
38.53%
10.75%
8.35%
9.92%
24.40%
35.49%

whereas the four county tracts ranged from 11.67 to 34.07 percent. Voter turnout was 23.65
percent in the former city tracts and 26.70 in the county remainder tracts, with an overall turnout
of 24.41 percent, which represents another decrease. Moreover, 1979 turnout levels, at least in
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the majority-minority tracts, are the lowest of the five years examined . Table 6.7 summarizes the
1979 election.

Figure 6.1
1975 Jacksonville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts

Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was 62
percent in 1963, 62 in 1967, 59 in 1971, 40 in 1975, and 37 percent in 1979. Participation
decreased slightly in 1971 despite it being the first election in which a "metro mayor" was elected
and voters in the "suburban" areas had a voice in city government. Overall voter participation
then dropped dramatically for the 1975 and 1979 elections. Black voter participation also
decreased over the span of 1963 to 1979 (see Figure 6.1 and Table 6.8). However, it actually
increased considerably before falling. In the former city (including tracts 29 and below), turnout in
the black tracts increased by over 5 percent between 1963 and 1967. Voting in the majority black
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Table 6.7
1979 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts

TractLevel
Turnout

608
459
482
1887
415
175
201
2486
2965

1970
Voting
Age
Pop.
2957
3300
2446
5510
1693
4214
2248
9044
9512

9678

40924

23.65%

428
787
1276
1154

3667
2310
3810
3866

11.67%
34.07%
33.49%
29.85%

TOT AL CO BALANCE

3645

13653

26.70%

TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

13323

54577

24.41%

Tract

Total
Voted

Total 2
Total 4
Total 5
Total 15
Total 16
Total 17
Total 18
Total 28
Total 29
TOT AL FORMER CITY
Total
Total
Total
Total

107
114
115
116

20.56%
13.91%
19.71%
34.25%
24.51%
4.15%
8.94%
27.49%
31.17%

tracts remained essentially level from 1967 to 1971 before decreasing to pre-1960s levels in 1975
and 1979. When former "county balance" areas were included in the consolidated government,
voting in the corresponding majority black tracts was initially about the same as in the former city,
but was higher in 1975 and 1979.
What might explain some of the differences in turnout levels? In terms of total voting
population participation, it might have been expected that the 1971 election would have sparked
an interest and spiked participation since it was the first election for a "metro mayor." Although
there had been a second local election in 1967 (the first had been in the spring) following
passage of the consolidation referendum in August, mayor had not been among the offices up for
election. The 1975 drop may be have a factor of the newness of consolidated government
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wearing off, or, as hypothesized, a feeling of vote dilution, being "small fish in a big pond,"

Figure 6.2
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among the electorate. In 1979, the mayor was elected in the general election contest between
Democrat Jake Godbold and Republican Don Brewer. Turnout was actually several percentage
point higher, however, for the first (42.9 percent) and second (45 percent) primary races, which
included Godbold, who had succeeded former mayor Hans Tanzler six months prior to fill the
remaining term, and Lew Brantley, former state Senate president (Drane, H. 1979, 22 April. And
then there were two ... Florida Times-Union, page 1.). Republicans only accounted for 4,489, or
2.25 percent, of the 199,994 registered voters in Duval County in 1979, which meant that by the
time of the general election, there wasn't much of a contest for mayor (Supervisor of Elections
I

office file of registered voters and voter turnout summary cards).
In terms of the slightly different trend in voting participation in the majority black tracts,
the increase between 1963 and 1967 may be related to Civil Rights and Voting Rights legislation
occurring in the interim as well as the fact that two strong black female candidates were running
for council positions in 1967. It is difficult to determine which might have had a stronger role.
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On

Table 6.8
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Jacksonville
Year

Black Turnout

Overall Turnout

1963

31.9%

62%

1967

37.1%

62%

1971

36.9%

59%

1975

28.3%

40%

1979

24.4%

37%

Note: Black turnout data based on author's calculations. Overall turnout data are as recorded
Documents in the office of the Duval County Supervisor of Elections.

In

one hand, Florida was one of two Southern states with high levels of black voter registration prior
to the Voting Rights Act (Alt 1994). However, the number of black registered voters in
Jacksonville increased from 24,107 to 29.153, a 17 percent change from 1963 to 1967. The
number of white registered voters in Jacksonville fell four percent from 45,935 to 44,046 during
the same period, which may be explained by white population shifts to the suburbs.
The lack of a notable drop-off in Jacksonville in 1971 might be a rallying response to the fact
that the percent of the population and of registered voters that were black was dramatically
decreased as a result of the consolidation. For example, in 1967, blacks were nearly 40 percent
of the registered electorate, but under 21 percent in 1971.

Unconsolidated Tampa as a Comparison
In unconsolidated Tampa, which might be used as a control to check for effects of the
Voting Rights Act on black turnout in Jacksonville, overall voter turnout pre- and post-Voting
Rights Act in Tampa mayoral elections fell from 71,065 in 1963 to 60,879 in 1967 (Smith, F.
Tampa Tribune Sept. 261963 Page B-1 City race unaltered; Cox, B. September 28,1967 Tampa
Tribune, Greco strides through city in post-election happiness, Page 2-B.). The 1963 turnout
was a near record 62 percent for the city (Tampa Tribune, 26 September 1962, "It's bigger than
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men," Page 12-A). Moreover, based on limited data available on precinct-level voter registration
by race , black voter turnout in mayoral elections also decreased from 1963 to 1967. For the 10
city precincts in which blacks comprised over 50 percent of registered voters, turnout fell from
59.57 percent in 1963 to 42.80 percent in 1967. When a 70 percent black registered voter
criterion is used, there are six "black" city precincts. Turnout in those Tampa precincts also fell
between 1963 and 1967, from 56.60 percent to 41 .55 percent.

18

Many attribute the high turnout

in 1963 to interest in two events occurring the day preceding the 1963 election: indictment of
three incumbent council members plus the release of a report recommending zoning reform
(Smith , F. Sept. 25, 1963; Tampa Tribune, Nuccio beats Lane by 1,910 votes; Page 1-A) .

Figure 6.3
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Figure 6.2 depicts black voter turnout over time in unconsolidated Tampa for the elections
preceding and following the Voting Rights Act. At the same time voting increased in Jacksonville
pre- and post-Voting Rights Act, it decreased in Tampa. Hence, federal legislation may not
necessarily have played as major a role in black turnout as other factors.
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Calculations are based on prec inct-level registration data available from the Hill sborough County
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Socieconomic Factors
The fairly wide range in participation among the majority black areas lends itself to further
analysis. Of course, it is possible that competition for other local offices unique to that area, such
as council member, may have affected the levels. It is noteworthy, however, that the lowest
participation levels seemed to be concentrated in the same areas over time. Therefore, it is
essential to look at demographic differences between the areas.
Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty levels, educational
attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in black participation
levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. The Census
reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups
was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, could be
calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty
population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line was
established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census.
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would
increase. Measured in terms of median years of education attained by the population 25 and
older, data from the 1960s and 1970s, reported in Table 6.9, didn't show any obvious correlation
with turnout. In several cases, the relationship was unexpected, I.e. areas with lower educational
attainment had some of the higher turnout rates.
Similar to educational attainment, income did not show an obvious strong correlation to
voter turnout. It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Table
6.10 data reveal some unexpected instances, such as Tract 18 in 1971 with one of the lowest
household income as percent of area median but turnout among the highest.
Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed some stronger direct
correlation, as hypothesized, in the 1960s and 1970s elections. Although it was not the case in

Supervisor of Elections Office and precinct-level actual votes reported in the Tampa Tribune.
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Table 6.9
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963 - 1979
Tract

Yrs.
Educ.
1960
7.5
8.5
7.8
6.9
7.6

Turnout
1963

Turnout
1967

Yrs.
Educ.
1970
8.1
10
8.6
8.3
8.3

Turnout
1971

Turnout
1975

Turnout
1979

4
40.60%
30.64%
34.94%
20.09%
13.91%
n/a
n/a
39.84%
38.53%
15
34.25%
37.45%
16
n/a
n/a
10.75%
24.51%
14.64%
8.35%
17
n/a
n/a
4.15%
n/a
n/a
9.92%
18
39.64%
8.94%
n/a
n/a
26.26%
32.38%
n/a
n/a
n/a
15/16/17/18
31.27%
39.96%
28
8.1
10.1
36.23%
24.40%
27.49%
29
40.08%
48.45%
44.63%
35.49%
31.17%
8.5
8.4
n/a
n/a
107
n/a
11.6
35.75%
36.30%
11.67%
n/a
n/a
n/a
114
12
34.07%
46.58%
36.45%
38.14%
n/a
n/a
115
8.9
24.44%
33.49%
n/a
44.41%
34.48%
n/a
n/a
n/a
11.2
116
29.85%
Source: U.S. Censuses of PopulatIOn and Housmg 1960. PHC(1)-66 JacksonvIlle, Fla. SMSA.

Table 6.10
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and
Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979
Tract

Household
Income %
of Area,
1959
50.69%
67.74%
45.07%
40.67%
41.70%

Turnout
1963

Turnout
1967

Household
Income %
of Area,
1969
43.65%
59.82%
39.88%
32.99%
36.53%

Turnout
1971

Turnout
1975

Turnout
1979

30.64%
34.94%
13.91%
40.60%
4
20.09%
39.84%
34.25%
n/a
n/a
15
38.53%
n/a
n/a
16
37.45%
10.75%
24.51%
4.15%
17
n/a
n/a
14.64%
8.35%
18
n/a
n/a
39.64%
9.92%
8.94%
n/a
26.26%
32.38%
n/a
n/a
n/a
15/16/17/18
n/a
28
68.93%
39.96%
65.30%
36.23%
24.40%
27.49%
31.27%
48.45%
40.08%
61.02%
44.63%
35.49%
31.17%
29
68.84%
n/a
n/a
107
n/a
102.30%
35.75%
36.30%
11.67%
n/a
n/a
114
n/a
122.30%
46.58%
36.45%
34.07%
38.14%
n/a
n/a
n/a
115
51.31%
24.44%
33.49%
116
n/a
n/a
44.41%
n/a
91.37%
34.48%
29.85%
Source: U.S. Censuses of Population and HOUSing 1960. PHC(1)-66 Jacksonvtfle, Fla. SMSA.
Median income as percent of area calculated from Table P-1 data.
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every majority black tract, there were some notable examples. In 1963 and 1967, e.g., Tract 28
and Tract 29 had the highest rates of homeownership and among the highest turnout rates,
though Tract 4 was an exception, with a much lower turnout rate but similar turnout rate. In the
1970s, 114 and 116 had high homeownership rates and high turnout. Tracts, 16, 17, and 18 had
low homeownership rates and low turnout. Tract 108 seems an anomaly with the second highest
homeownership rate but one of the lower turnout rates. Moreover, there are several instances of
tracts with homeownership rates in the middle of the range with a wider range of turnout rates.
Table 6.11 presents detailed homeownership data.

Table 6.11
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979
Percent Turnout Turnout Percent Turnout Turnout Turnout
Owned
1971
1975
1979
1967
Owned
1963
1970
1960
45%
34.94%
20.09%
13.91%
30.64%
4
39%
40.60%
38.53%
48%
n/a
47%
39.84%
34.25%
n/a
15
10.75%
16%
n/a
21%
37.45%
24.51%
n/a
16
10%
14.64%
8.35%
7%
n/a
4.15%
17
n/a
7%
39.64%
9.92%
8.94%
5%
n/a
n/a
18
26.26%
32.38%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
15/16/17/18
60%
31.27%
39.96%
24.40%
28
27.49%
60%
36.23%
48.45%
56%
44.63%
35.49%
31.17%
63%
40.08%
29
36.30%
84%
35.75%
11.67%
nfa
n/a
n/a
107
114
n/a
nfa
93%
46.58%
36.45%
34.07%
nfa
38.14%
33.49%
nfa
58%
24.44%
115
n/a
n/a
116
nfa
n/a
44.41%
34.48%
29.85%
nfa
79%
Source: U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing 1960. PHC(1)-66 JacksonVille, Fla. SMSA.
Homeownership rate calculated from Table H-1 (owner-occupied as percent of all housing units).
Tract

Jacksonville in Summary
Black voter turnout in Jacksonville followed a general trend of a decrease, at least for the
study years. The decrease mirrored an overall decline in voter turnout following the consolidation
of Jacksonville and Duval County. Table 6.12 outlines changes in black voter turnout and
possible explanations. Black turnout had increased by over five percent between 1963 and 1967,
when two black representatives were elected to the old city government following a decades-long
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drought of municipal descriptive black representation.
Turnout among blacks was only 0.2 percent lower, virtually unchanged, in the first
mayoral election following consolidation, although overall turnout decreased by about three
percent. It is possible that there were effects of the Voting Rights Act that prevented larger
changes in participation levels; however, the difference between overall turnout and black turnout
was not alarming. Moreover, since turnout did not increase in unconsolidated Tampa during

Table 6.12
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors
Time Period
1963-1967

Change
+5.2 percent

1967-1971

-0.2 percent

1971-1975

-8.6 percent

1975-1979

-3.9 percent

Factors/Notes
Two strong black candidates
for council positions
If any "first blush effect"
occurred, there would likely
have been a larqer decrease
Newness of consolidation
worn off; possible feelings of
loss of voting strength
Consistent with overall
decrease

the pre- and post- voting rights legislation elections, it is likely that the consolidation and/or other
local factors were at play in the changes in Jacksonville turnout.
As in Nashville, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently
explain variations in turnout among the black electoral districts. There were some apparent
correlations between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure
showing the strongest possibilities. However, several exceptions make it likely that other factors,
such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.
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CHAPTER VII
LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY BACKGROUND

Over three decades after the last large-scale U.S. city-county consolidation (Indianapolis
in 1969-70-see Appendix), a referendum to consolidate Louisville and Jefferson County was
successful in 2000 after a long history of efforts to reorganize local government, including two
previous failed consolidation referenda. At the time of the consolidation campaign, blacks
comprised nearly one-third of the Louisville population, and the support of the black community
was considered essential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black
politics and representation in Louisville prior to consolidation, offers background on local
government and the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black
political power and participation.

BLACK POLITICS AND LOUISVILLE GOVERNMENT PRE-CONSOLIDATION
As part of a Civil War border state in which many identified with the South (including
slave trade businesses in the 1860s), Louisville, Kentucky had a legacy of segregationist values
that was apparent well into the twentieth century (Yater 2001). At the turn of the century,
Louisville ranked seventh in the nation in terms of the number of black residents-over 39,000and blacks comprised over 19 percent of the population. That proportion hovered in the upper
and mid-teens until the period between 1960 and 1990, when the city's population of black
residents shifted from approximately 18 percent to almost 30 percent. The trend is largely
attributable to a white population outflow to suburban areas, while the number of blacks increased
slightly in the city (Cummings & Price 1997). By 2000, the black population proportion was nearly
one-third. Louisville was historically, and remains today largely segregated residentially, with
blacks primarily concentrated in the "West End," (just west of downtown), a few neighborhoods
immediately south and southeast of downtown, and an enclave in the somewhat suburban
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Newburg area just south of 1-264; the segregation index, though, has decreased somewhat from
the 1970s to the present.
Kentucky may be considered part of the South as a Civil War border state, but, in
contrast to many parts of the South, post-Civil War blacks in Louisville were never denied the
right to vote (Braden 2001). However, during the Reconstruction period and well beyond, blacks
did not have much political influence in Louisville. In 1917, the NAACP helped black leaders
overturn a segregation ordinance and blacks helped Republicans regain political control of the
city. Between 1917 and 1931, Republicans relied on the black vote to help maintain their power
(Cummings & Price 1997). However, because the Republicans generally did not follow through
by supporting blacks once the elections were complete, blacks began to sever ties with the party.
Blacks organized the Lincoln Independent Party in the early 1920s, and although the party was
unable to get any candidates elected, it elevated the political clout of blacks in the community and
was a factor in getting blacks onto the police force and into the fire department (Hudson 2001). In
the 1930s, black had "significant political breakthroughs" as "shifting political alliances"
encouraged both the Democratic and Republican parties to sponsor black candidates (Yater
2001, p. xxvi). Because Democrats had a black man running for state representative, black votes
helped the Democratic slate win the mayor's office after a long stint of Republican control (Yater
2001 ).
In 1945, Eugene S. Clayton became the first black elected to Louisville's Board of
Aldermen. Several others followed, including Louise Reynolds, Lois Morris, and the Rev. W.L.
Hodge (Hudson 2001). Beginning in the 1950s, civil rights progress helped pave the way for
blacks to increase their political clout. All library branches were desegregated by 1952, and
public parks followed shortly thereafter. Schools were integrated without incident in 1956 (Yater
2001). Though there were some high racial tensions in the 1960s and 1970s, including the
movement for open housing (an act was passed in 1967), a race riot that erupted in 1968, and
the contentious 1975 school busing order as a measure to desegregate schools, blacks
continued to make steady political progress. By 1962, there was consistently one black alderman
on the 12-member Board of Aldermen. Following the dramatic civil rights progress in the mid-
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1960s, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the
number of blacks on the Board of Alderman doubled to two, or 17 percent. By the mid-1970s,
blacks comprised one-fourth, and by 1982, one-third of the Board of Aldermen (Cummings &
Price 1997).
Consolidated Louisville-Jefferson County is unique by comparison to the other large cities
in terms of black political power in that blacks had achieved proportional representation in the city
decades before the merger of the two local governments. This feature can be attributed in part to
the fact that Louisville's consolidation happened nearly four decades after passage of the Civil
Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the early 1980s, when two
consolidations were rejected by the public, African-Americans comprised about 28 percent of the
city's population and held four of the 12 positions (33 percent) on the city's Board of Aldermen.
Louisville and Jefferson County have a long history of efforts to reform the local
government. Most of the efforts focused on city-county consolidation. In the late 1940s, County
Commissioner E. P. White urged city-county consolidation and Mayor Leland Taylor said that
merger was eventually certain to happen. In the early 1950s, the Kentucky constitution and tax
laws were cited as barriers to consolidation. The 1956 Mallon Plan sought to expand Louisville's
boundaries by 46 square miles but failed at the polls due to a dual-majority requirement for the
suburbs and the city. Another expansion plan, the Morton-Wyatt Plan, failed to clear the
Kentucky General Assembly in 1970. When a plan for city-county consolidation endorsed by both
the mayor and the county judge-executive was rejected by the Kentucky General Assembly in
1980, the city tried to annex parts of Jefferson County (Vogel 1994).
In 1982, enabling legislation for city-county consolidation passed the General Assembly
and was placed on the November ballot. It was defeated by a narrow margin. With a few minor
changes, the plan was presented as a referendum again in 1983. It was also defeated due to a
dual-majority requirement. In both cases, the city supported consolidation and the county
opposed it. However, African-Americans, whose population base was concentrated mostly in the
city, clearly opposed merger. Clayton and Hagan (2003) show that of 38 majority-black precincts
in 1983, all but one voted against consol.idation.
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An alliance of blacks in the city's west end and blue-collar whites in Louisville's south end
and southwestern Jefferson County was a major factor in the defeat of the 1982 and 1983 merger
proposals. Both groups shared concerns about the motives of power elites in the east end and
the business community driving the efforts (Vogel 1994; Cummings & Price 1997). The coalition
was somewhat ironic in that just a few years prior to this joint effort, the two groups were at odds
over the busing issue (Braden 2001). Blacks in particular were opposed to the effort because of
fears that they would lose newly-gained political power and influence through population dilution
in a merged government. Blacks had organized an influential political action committee, PAC-10,
in 1981, and one of its "notable successes" was organizing black voters against the merger
efforts (Braden 2001). Black opposition was led by attorney Darryl Owens (who later became a
county commissioner) and State Senator Georgia Davis Powers. Both had been members of the
Charter Commission that drafted the merger legislation in 1982 (Vogel 1994).
More annexation attempts by the city occurred throughout the early 1980s until Louisville
and Jefferson County entered into ''The Compact," a 12-year agreement for a moratorium on
annexation, shared financial responsibility of several local government agencies, and
occupational tax revenue sharing, in 1986 (Vogel 1994). With concern about the longevity of The
Compact, local leaders had already begun to look again at restructuring local government in the
early 1990s. In 1994, the Jefferson County Governance Project was established, and a citizen
task force appointed. The citizen task force made a recommendation against city-county
consolidation and proposed a reorganization that transferred more resources and political power
to the county. The proposal was not acted upon by the legislature. The Compact was renewed
in 1998, but later that year, the state legislative delegation from Jefferson County established the
Task Force on Local Government, which consisted of state and municipal officials from Jefferson
County and Louisville. By the fall of 1999, city-county consolidation was once again proposed
(Savitch and Vogel 2000a).
The health of the economy and economic development and tax base concerns have long
been a reason cited for consolidation, but other factors may have been at play.
It is unclear whether the impetus for local government reorganization in the
community really stems from economic development concerns or if concern for
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economic development has become the vehicle to sell local government
reorganization. The business community has long favored merger in this
community. It is also unclear whether it is really economic development or some
other issues that led the mayor and county judge to favor merger or other
metropolitan government schemes. The most common explanation provided by
both business leaders and the mayor and judge for local government
reorganization is that a community must have one common vision and leader and
that this is not the case in Louisville and Jefferson County (Vogel 1994, p. 31).

LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE NEW PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION
As the end of The Compact between Louisville and Jefferson County had loomed,
relatively little effort was placed into consideration of renewing the agreement as compared to a
renewed focus on city-county consolidation efforts. It had been renewed in 1998, but city-county
consolidation was already on the minds of leaders (Savitch and Vogel 2000a). In 2000, new
enabling legislation for city-county consolidation was passed by the Kentucky General Assembly.
The original plan was for a special election for the public referendum; however, "pro-merger
legislators agreed to change the merger vote from a single-issue special election scheduled in
May 2001 to the November 7,2000 presidential election," a tactic that would result in larger
turnout and "limit the amount of time the public would have to debate the merger issue and mount
significant opposition to it" (Clayton and Hagan 2003, p. 9).
Prominent local proponents of the 2000 merger referendum, including business leaders,
the chamber of commerce, and the major local newspaper, the Courier-Journal, were typical of
supporters in other city-county consolidation cases. In addition, the mayor, the county judgeexecutive, the immediate past mayor and county judge-executive, and U.S. Senator Mitch
McConnell, a past county judge-executive, also endorsed merger. A sophisticated, well-funded
pro-merger campaign called Unity outspent the opposition group, Citizens Organized in Search of
Truth (COST) by a large margin, approximately $1.25 million to $70,000 (Clayton and Hagan
2003; Shafer 2000). Strong opponents included County Commissioner Darryl Owens, an African
American, as well as the majority of the Board of Aldermen, some police and fire fighter groups,
some of the smaller suburban city governments, some neighborhood associations, and a variety
of progressive activist groups such as the NAACP and the Kentucky Alliance Against Racist and
Political Repression.
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Unity supporters argued that merger was desperately needed and predicted a negative
future outlook for the Louisville area if the city and county were not consolidated into the City of
Greater Louisville. Pro-merger arguments included that merger was necessary to increase
efficiency and effectiveness by eliminating duplicate services and lowering the ratio of citizens to
legislators in the county by forming many relatively small council districts (prior to consolidation,
Fiscal Court, the county's governing body, was comprised of three county commissioners and the
county judge-executive).
Opponents were concerned about issues such as preservation of public service jobs
such as police and fire positions, urban service districts, and minority political representation.
The issue of minority political representation was particularly notable because none of the
proposed districts had been drawn prior to the vote as they had in Nashville and Jacksonville, so
black voters had no guarantees. Supporters of merger accused opponents of trying to protect
their own jobs and of spreading fear about merger based in "myths." Beginning October 1, 2000,
and leading up to the election, the Courier-Journal began running daily "Myths About Merger"
sections, purporting to debunk the myths, on the editorial pages.
Whereas in the 1982 and 1983 merger attempts, vocal black support was essentially
nonexistent, some prominent black leaders did endorse the consolidation in 2000, including
Louisville Urban League president Ben Richmond, former deputy mayor and chamber of
commerce executive vice president Bill Summers IV, and wealthy entrepreneur Charlie Johnson.
Moreover, the Louisville Defender, a black community newspaper, surprised many with its
endorsement. Blacks in support of consolidation claimed the need to grow rather than stagnate
or decline economically was even more important than black political representation. After
announcing his support in February, Johnson, however, withdrew his support in June primarily
due to concerns about representation (McDonough 2000). The plan called for 26 council districts,
of which there would likely be a maximum of five or six majority-black districts, and there were no
guarantees of those numbers. Said Johnson,
"I said I was for merger if all issues could be worked out in a fair and equitable
way. I have not seen that the issues have been worked out. We need to get
back to the drawing board and work out the details of this so that most people
can be satisfied" (McDonough 2000).
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The consolidation referendum passed with a dual majority and an overall vote of
approximately 54 percent for the consolidation. Clayton and Hagan (2003) note that the margin
of support in the county increased significantly between the 1983 and 2000 votes. Most African
Americans lived in the city in both of those elections, and a larger proportion of blacks voted
against merger in 2000 than did in 1983, an increase of 6.9 percent from 74.8 percent against in
1983 to 81.7 percent against in 2000 (Clayton and Hagan 2003).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION
A unique provision of the merger legislation was that the representative districts were to
be drawn not by elected officials, as is generally the case, but by a geography professor at the
University of Louisville. Moreover, it also required that the Jefferson County Fiscal Court adopt
the plan created by the geographer without making any amendments (Clayton and Hagan 2003).
It did, however, allow for public hearings on the plan.
Professor Bill Dakan drafted several versions for public comment before submitting the
final version in July 2001. The major point of concern was the number of majority black districts,
particularly since the U.S. Department of Justice was investigating whether the merger
referendum passed into law violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (McDonough 2001, June 9).
The initial plan, introduced in June, included five majority black districts with a sixth minority
influence district including both blacks and Hispanics. In early July, other drafts for public
comment reduced the number of minority districts to four, increased them to five, and added a
sixth in the course of a few days in early July. The final plan included five majority black districts
and a sixth minority district comprised of roughly 45 percent African Americans and 6 percent
other non-white races (McDonough 2001, July 6).
Blacks were elected to six of 26 council seats following the first metropolitan government
election in 2002, a number repeated in the 2006 election. In terms of descriptive representation,
this means that blacks continue to exceed proportional representation in local government in
Louisville, holding approximately 23 percent of the council seats while compriSing roughly 19
percent of Jefferson County's population. In terms of substantive representation, though, power
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dynamics may have shifted for blacks. For several decades, blacks have identified strongly with
the Democratic Party after the Republican Party shifted away from its party of Lincoln/Civil War
era roots. As noted by Clayton and Hagan (2003), prior to consolidation, all 12 members of
Louisville's Board of Aldermen were Democrats. The merging of the city and county
governments split the power base among parties by incorporating suburbs more likely to vote
Republican. In fact, on the first council, Republicans won 11 of the 26 seats (42 percent), a
number maintained in the 2006 election.
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CHAPTER VIII
LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS

As in Nashville and Jacksonville, race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in
Louisville. The black community was divided in its support, with some black business and civic
leaders campaigning for the consolidation and others speaking vociferously against it due
primarily to concerns about representation. This chapter examines voter turnout in the two
elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and two following the consolidation and
finds that, contrary to expectations, voter turnout increased over time. Moreover, a brief
comparison to unconsolidated Covington is included, along with some possible explanations for
changes in participation levels.
Mayoral elections immediately preceding and following the consolidation were held in
November 1989, November 1993, November 1998, November 2002, and November 2006. Prior
to what would have been a 1997 mayoral election at the end of a third and final four-year term for
incumbent mayor Jerry Abramson, there was a state-mandated transition in the election cycle to
place local and federal elections on the same cycle. The 1992 constitutional amendment meant
that the winner in the 1993 mayoral race would serve a five-year term, with the next mayoral race
occurring in 1998 (Goodwin 1993). Because the Jefferson County Board of Elections was unable
to locate precinct boundary maps and precinct-level turnout reports for 1989, this study will
examine only two elections prior to city-county consolidation, 1993 and 1998. Figure 8.1 depicts
a section of the large poster-size 2002 electoral map with Census tracts drawn.
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Figure 8.1
2002 Louisville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts

In 1990, there were 23 Census tracts in Jefferson County with populations over 70
percent black. However, the boundaries of two of those tracts, 113.02 and 128.01, were located
entirely or mostly outside of City of Louisville boundaries in Shively and the Newburg
neighborhood respectively. In 2000, there were two fewer 70 percent black tracts in Jefferson
County, for a total of 21. One of those , 113.02, was located outside the former city boundary in
the Newburg area, site of a large subsidized housing development. Table 8.1 lists the majority
black tracts.

95

Table 8.1
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Louisville-Jefferson County,
1990-2000
Tract

1990 Percent Black

2000 Percent Black

4
81.02%
73.93%
88.20%
94.17%
6
95.43%
96.03%
7
97.94%
97.84%
8
94.77%
96.99%
9
10
97.79%
98.76%
98.32%
96.38%
11
97.90%
12
93.71%
*
99.52%
13
14
99.56%
96.49%
95.27%
15
93.72%
90.93%
92.34%
16
17
99.34%
92.57%
98.20%
95.55%
18
*
20
93.53%
95.74%
92.97%
24
27
96.09%
86.62%
92.96%
83.88%
28
91.33%
95.07%
30
73.84%
78.52%
35
83.00%
62
73.43%
Outside former City boundary
84.77%
87.90%
113.02
*
74.26%
128.01
Note: Tracts marked with an astensk (*) denote that a maJonty black population or the tract was
no longer extant.

Over the four mayoral election cycles in Louisville, two occurring pre-consolidation and
two post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed the same
pattern, although turnout in the majority black tracts remained at levels several percentage points
below the overall turnout levels. Tables 2 through 5 offer detailed tract-specific turnout
information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 8.1 presents a summary
of black and overall turnout over the time period.
In 1993, overall local turnout was approximately 41.3 percent. The black turnout rate was
less than half that, at 20.14 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 6.01
percent to 46.4 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since
half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see
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Table 8.2).

Table 8.2
1993 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
20
24
27
28
30
35
62
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

Tract Level Turnout

679
334
595
500
215
390
974
282
425
207
464
428
363
76
260
297
512
432
132
336
165

1990 Voting Age
Population
3247
1338
2294
1862
1864
2026
2953
1690
916
1930
2539
2348
1992
1259
1261
1918
2375
1518
2170
1129
1479

8076

40107

20.14%

20.91%
24.99%
25.94%
26.85%
11.51%
19.25%
32.98%
16.66%
46.40%
10.70%
18.27%
18.23%
6.01%
20.58%
15.46%
21.56%
28.46%
6.06%
29.72%
11.16%
17.44%

For the 1998 election, overall local turnout was approximately 48.4 percent. The black
turnout rate also increased, but continued to lag behind the overall level by nearly 20 percentage
points at 29.81 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 8.08 percent to 65.72
percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since nearly half of the
tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.3).
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Table 8.3
1998 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract Level Turnout

1004
506
962
799
313
600
1223
403
602
263
706
65
370
102
417
325
741
745
278
391
541

1990 Voting Age
Population
3247
1338
2294
1862
1864
2026
2953
1690
916
1930
2539
2348
1992
1259
1261
1918
2375
1518
2170
1129
1479

11956

40107

29.81%

Tract

Total Voted

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
20
24
27
28
30
35
62
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS

30.92%
37.82%
41.94%
42.88%
16.77%
29.60%
41.42%
23.85%
65.72%
13.63%
27.81%
28.32%
18.56%
8.08%
33.07%
16.94%
31.20%
49.08%
12.79%
34.59%
36.58%

In 2002, the first "metro" election, overall local turnout was approximately 52.5 percent. The
black turnout rate increased again, too, yet remained over 17 points behind at 35.29 percent.
Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 12.49 percent to 69.95 percent, although the
range low and high seemed to be outliers of sorts since several of the tracts had turnout within a
few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.4).
In 2006, overall local turnout was approximately 53 percent, virtually unchanged from 2002.
The black turnout rate, at 38.34 percent, gained some ground against the overall turnout rate.
However, several pieces of missing data for 2006 make comparison difficult. For two-thirds of the
19 Census tracts, turnout information for some of the precincts matching the tracts, according to
the available map, was unavailable on the precinct turnout report for 2006. This may mean that
the map was an incorrect version or that election data were incomplete. However, the available
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Table 8.4
2002 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

4
6
7

1382
503
812
1226
620
907
1209
1147
282
685
686
226
443

8
9
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
24
27
28
30
35
62

2000 Voting Age
Population
3621
1002
2176
1752
1666
1967
2711
2248
807
2213
2236
1810
1222
3590
2317
1371
1996
1136
1500

.
.

725
580

.

282

37341
13178
TOTAL ALL
BLACK TRACTS
Note: Astensk (*) denotes partial missing data/Incomplete information.

Tract Level Turnout
38.17%
50.20%
37.29%
69.95%
37.21%
46.11%
44.60%
51.02%
34.94%
30.95%
30.68%
12.49%
36.25%

.
.

52.88%
29.06%

..

18.80%
35.29%

data for the majority black tracts indicate a continuity of trend, which may lend some credibility to
the map.
Over the study period, the trend in voter turnout in the majority black tracts mirrored that
of overall local turnout (see Figure 8.1). A nine-percent jump in the black tracts and a sevenpercent jump overall occurred between 1993 and 1998, when the election for mayor was on the
same ballot as federal offices, which would have been expected; turnout has historically been
higher for state and national office elections than for local offices. Moreover, both overall turnout
and turnout in the black tracts increased by four to five percentage points between 1998 and the
first metro election. Finally, only a minor increase-less than one percent-was seen overall
between 2002 and 2006, although the few available data for the black tracts indicates a threepercent gain; that figure may be an artifact of too few cases.
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Table 8.5
2006 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts
Tract

Total Voted

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
24
27
28
30
35
62

1343

2000 Voting Age
Population
3621
1002
2176
1752
1666
1967
2711
2248
807
2213
2236
1810
1222
3590
2317
1371
1996
1136
1500

"
*

"
"
"

"
1178
434
707
689
*

383
*

"
*

"
*

"

TOTAL ALL
4734*
12347*
BLACK TRACTS
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes partial missing data/mcomplete mformatlon.

Tract Level Turnout
37.09%

"
•
"

"
"

"
52.40%
53.78%
31.95%
30.81%

"
31.34%

"
"

•
"

•
"
38.34%"

Fifteen of the tracts experienced continued increases in voter turnout over time, although
two of the tracts, 13 and 20, didn't exist in 2000 and two more tracts, 27 and 35, only had two
years of complete data for comparison, and data on only three cycles were available for six
others, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 28. Furthermore, it is also notable that for tracts 12 and 14, the
amounts of increase in turnout were much larger than the overall trends, e.g., turnout more than
doubled for each between 1998 and 2002.
Although this study is not including the 1989 election, some background context from the
1989 election and overall turnout can inform the analysis of Louisville-Jefferson County. In 1989,
the incumbent mayor, Democrat Jerry Abramson was running for re-election to a second term. He
was able to run again after a 1986 constitutional amendment that made Abramson "the first
mayor in this century who had the right to succeed himself" (McDonough, November 8, 1989).
When he had won his first term in 1985, turnout in all of Jefferson County for municipal elections
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was 41 percent. Because of a 20 percent decline in the Jefferson County voter rolls and the lack
of serious opposition-there was no Republican candidate, only a little-known independent-to
the popular Abramson, numbers of voters at the polls were expected to be lower. A large portion
of the decline in voter registration was attributed to actions by state and local election officials.
State officials purged about 50,000 Jefferson County voters because they had not voted in the
prior four years. Local officials dropped another 25,000 after their voter registration cards could
not be delivered. The largest decline, however, was among black voters. The number of black
registered voters dropped about 25 percent between 1985 and 1989 after sustained growth in the
1970s and early 1980s achieved in part by NAACP voter-registration drive efforts (McDonough
November 6, 1989). However, there had been some broad interest in the local race for Jefferson

County Judge-Executive, which made news for candidates David Armstrong and John G.
Heyburn II each raising and/or spending over a million dollars (McDonough, November 8, 1989).
Moreover, there had been a degree of public controversy after the Louisville Board of Aldermen
voted to raise their own pay by 40 percent, an unpopular move vetoed by Mayor Abramson

(McDonough, November 7, 1989).
The 1993 election would be the last time that Jerry Abramson could run for Louisville
mayor. A 1986 constitutional change limited mayors to three terms (Goodwin 1993). Abramson
had remained very popular and did not face strong opposition; he defeated the Republican
candidate, Tommy Klein, by a margin of greater than four-to-one. Overall turnout was 41.3
percent.
In 1998, the very popular Abramson was unable to run for mayor again, and popular twoterm County Judge-Executive David Armstrong decided to run for mayor. Even though polling
indicated that it wasn't a tight mayoral race, turnout was expected to be higher than in the
previous mayoral contest because it was coinciding with a federal election, with former baseball
star Jim Bunning running for U.S. Senate and Congresswoman Anne Northup seeking a second
term (Shafer 1998). Overall voter turnout was 48.4 percent.
The 2002 election was the first for the new "metro" government and the second to
coincide with a federal election. Former Louisville mayor Jerry Abramson handily won the
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Democratic primary and faced only moderate competition from Republican Jack Early, but all 26
council seats were at stake. Overall turnout in the county, which closely mirrors the metropolitan
boundary with the exception of some small cities enclosed within, was 52.5 percent, representing
a small bump post-consolidation.
In 2006, there was another metro mayor race, this time with Abramson facing tougher
competition from popular Republican council member Kelly Downard. Additionally, half of the
metro council seats were up for grabs due to the staggered election cycle (13 seats elected every
two years) outlined in the metropolitan charter. Countywide turnout was 53 percent.

Figure 8.1
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Unconsolidated Covington as a Comparison
The unconsolidated city of Covington, located in northern Kentucky in the Cincinnati,
Ohio metropolitan area, might be used as a comparison to consolidated Louisville-Jefferson
County as a means of screening for possible voter turnout effects of consolidation. According to
the main hypothesis , one might expect that the voting pattern would be different in the two sites,
with voting decreasing over time in Louisville's municipal elections and at a minimum decreasing
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Table 8.6
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Louisville
Year

Black Turnout

Overall Turnout

1993

20.14%

41.3%

1998

29.81%

48.4%

2002

35.29%

52.5%

2006

38.34%

53.0%

at a smaller rate in Covington. However, Louisville has shown a small increase in overall voter
turnout and slightly larger increase in black voter turnout post-consolidation. In Covington, voter
turnout decreased considerably and consistently in the four elections leading up to 2008, with the
largest decrease occurring between 1992 and 1996, when turnout dropped twenty points from
75.7 percent to 55.7 percent. Further declines occurred in 2000 (51.4 percent) and again in 2004
(47.7 percent). Jefferson County, Kenton County, and Kentucky each saw an overall decrease
over the same time period beginning with a precipitous drop in 1996; however, each gained back
some of the losses to end up no more than 10 to 13 percent down over time, compared to the
difference of 30 percent in Covington. It could be that lack of strength in local races in Covington
translated into lack of voter interest, or it could be a change in demographics in Covington.
Figure 8.2 depicts Covington overall voter turnout over time, which follows the opposite trend of
Louisville turnout (see Figure 8.1). The fact that Covington's mayoral elections were held
concurrently with presidential elections, however, as well as the fact that none of the elections
were held in coinciding years, makes comparison to Louisville difficult.

Socioeconomic Factors
As in Jacksonville and Nashville, the wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election
election years in Louisville lends itself to further analysis. It is possible that election-specific
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Figure 8.2
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factors played a role, such as the race in a particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and
higher turnout numbers seem to be concentrated in the same areas over time suggests that voter
characteristics might playa role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts
might explain some of the difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for
exploration of income, poverty levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as
contributors to spatial differences in black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions,
however, age has been removed. The Census reports historically have not included median age
on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups has been reported. Therefore, only a median
age group, with a range of multiple years, could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was
minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s
elections, since the concept of a poverty line was established in the 1960s and data were not
reported for the 1960 Census. Since age and poverty were not analyzed in the context of
elections adjacent to the earlier consolidations, they are also excluded from the analysis of
Louisville.
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would
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increase. Tract level educational attainment data for Louisville were reported differently than the
data reported for Nashville and Jacksonville in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than a median year
of schooling, e.g., 10.7, data were grouped into categories of highest level completed, such as
less eighth grade, less than high school, some college, etc. For the case of Louisville, turnout by
educational attainment is examined in terms of the percent of the population 25 and older that
has completed an associate degree or higher. In each of the majority black tracts, educational
attainment levels were low, at best slightly over half of the county-wide level. The data are
somewhat contrary to expectations. In 1993, for example, higher levels of attainment
corresponded with higher turnout levels and lower levels of education with lower turnout levels
just about as many times as it didn't, although several in the middle of the education range were
also in the middle of the turnout range. The situation was much the same in 1998 and 2002, with
data mixed with occasional exceptions/extremes but mostly middling tendencies. Too much
information was missing from 2006 for analysis purposes (see Table 8.7). Overall, educational
attainment might not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts.
It was also hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income
was measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of area median
household income. Although there were some mixed results, in all years, the higher income
levels had the higher turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 8.8). It
should be noted, however, that the highest incomes did not always equal the highest tumout. In
some cases, the top four or five in income were several spaces apart when ranked by turnout
percentage. Overall, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple
exceptions to the expectations, it appears that income may not explain much of the difference
among turnout in black tracts.
Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with
turnout over the years, although of the three socioeconomic variables being analyzed, there were
fewer exceptions to expectations. For example, in 1993, 1998, and 2002, two-thirds of the top
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Table 8.7
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006

Tract

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13*
14
15
16
17
18
20*
24
27
28
30
35
62

Percent
with
associate
or higher
1990
15.79%
14.05%
6.83%
15.95%
12.39%
8.92%
14.54%
8.87%
10.74%
4.4%
9.57%
8.78%
5.52%
7.34%
11.9%
3.4%
6.17%
7.76%
4.01%
2.13%
2.64%

Turnout
1993

20.91%
24.99%
25.94%
26.85%
11.51%
19.25%
32.98%
16.66%
46.40%
10.70%
18.27%
18.23%
6.01%
20.58%
15.46%
21.56%
28.46%
6.06%
29.72%
11.16%
17.44%

Turnout
1998

30.92%
37.82%
41.94%
42.88%
16.77%
29.60%
41.42%
23.85%
65.72%
13.63%
27.81%
28.32%
18.56%
8.08%
33.07%
16.94%
31.20%
49.08%
12.79%
34.59%
36.58%

Percent
with
associate
or higher
2000
14.91%
9.23%
12.44%
17.25%
20.66%
9.2%
17.87%
16.11%
*
13.33%
12.94%
12.26%
11.94%
7.63%
*
10.11%
7.71%
9.62%
5.52%
3.14%
6.9%

Turnout
2002

38.17%
50.20%
37.29%
69.95%
37.21%
46.11%
44.60%
51.02%
*
34.94%
30.95%
30.68%
12.49%
36.25%
*
**
**
52.88%
29.06%
**
18.80%

Turnout
2006

37.09%
**
**
**
**
**
**
52.40%
*
53.78%
31.95%
30.81%
**
31.34%
*
**
**
**
**
**
**

24.57%
Jefferson
41.3%
48.4%
30.42%
52.5%
53.0%
County
Note: Astensk (*) indicated tract did not eXist that year. Double astensk (**) indicated missing
data.

three in terms of tenure were also in the top three in terms of turnout.

In 2006, there were too

few tracts with complete data for comparison. Again, as with educational attainment and income,
there were many in the middle of the range in terms of percent of residents who owned their
home that were mixed in terms of expectations, and there were a couple of outliers, such as
tracts 15 and 30 (see Table 8.9).

Therefore, although tenure appears to have a closer

relationship to turnout than income and education, it may not be useful in explaining the
difference in turnout among black tracts. It is possible, then, that specific races, i.e., candidates,
may have played a role in the turnout levels.
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Table 8.8
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and
Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006
Tract

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13*
14
15
16
17
18
20*
24
27
28
30
35
62

Household
Income, %
of Area,
1989
89.15%
54.36%
61.85%
99.86%
49.15%
51.47%
73.75%
63.64%
83.05%
19.70%
57.24%
61.44%
74.82%
36.21%
41.72%
32.61%
31.30%
44.76%
18.45%
18.45%
23.83%

Turnout
1993

20.91%
24.99%
25.94%
26.85%
11.51%
19.25%
32.98%
16.66%
46.40%
10.70%
18.27%
18.23%
6.01%
20.58%
15.46%
21.56%
28.46%
6.06%
29.72%
11.16%
17.44%

Turnout
1998

30.92%
37.82%
41.94%
42.88%
16.77%
29.60%
41.42%
23.85%
65.72%
13.63%
27.81%
28.32%
18.56%
8.08%
33.07%
16.94%
31.20%
49.08%
12.79%
34.59%
36.58%

Household
Income, %
of Area,
1999
66.93%
44.30%
67,63%
73.83%
67.62%
44.02%
60.15%
68.91%
*

53.28%
55.33%
79.65%
58.08%
35.54%
*
39.37%
39.41%
60.15%
17.09%
15.42%
32.86%

Turnout
2002

38.17%
50.20%
37.29%
69.95%
37.21%
46.11%
44.60%
51.02%
*
34.94%
30.95%
30.68%
12.49%
36.25%
*
**
**
52.88%
29.06%
**
18.80%

Turnout
2006

37.09%
**
**
**
**

**
**

52.40%
*
53.78%
31.95%
30.81%
**
31.34%
*
**
**
**
**
**
**

Louisville in Summary
Black voter turnout in Louisville increased steadily over the study years. The trend
mirrored an overall climb in voter turnout that continued following the consolidation of Louisville
and

JeffE~rson

County. Table 8.10 outlines changes in black voter turnout and possible

explanations. The largest increase in black voter turnout, nearly 10 percent, occurred between
1993 and 1998, when state legislation required the municipal elections to coincide with federal
elections cycles. It is not surprising to see higher turnout for higher offices.
Turnout among blacks increased 5.5 percent in the first mayoral election following
consolidation, with overall turnout also increasing by over four percent. Overall turnout was
nearly level in the next election, although black voter turnout increased again, that time by three
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Table 8.9
Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage)
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006
Tract

4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13*
14
15
16
17
18
20*
24
27
28
30
35
62
Jefferson
County

Percent
Owned
1990
79.81%
56.73%
67.53%
81.24%
53.77%
63.95%
75.20%
72.07%
77.78%
12.83%
63.55%
68.69%
70.39%
59.19%
49.21%
38.36%
45.15%
43.51%
2.80%
15.08%
38.99%

Turnout
1993

Turnout
1998

Percent
Owned

Turnout
2002

20.91%
24.99%
25.94%
26.85%
11.51%
19.25%
32.98%
16.66%
46.40%
10.70%
18.27%
18.23%
6.01%
20.58%
15.46%
21.56%
28.46%
6.06%
29.72%
11.16%
17.44%

30.92%
37.82%
41.94%
42.88%
16.77%
29.60%
41.42%
23.85%
65.72%
13.63%
27.81%
28.32%
18.56%
8.08%
33.07%
16.94%
31.20%
49.08%
12.79%
34.59%
36.58%

69.45%
51.90%
56.97%
74.24%
53.36%
52.56%
70.36%
71.77%
*
35.10%
61.57%
59.93%
61.20%
45.48%
*
29.70%
41.64%
61.22%
0.37%
16.56%%
58.34%

38.17%
50.20%
37.29%
69.95%
37.21%
46.11%
44.60%
51.02%
*
34.94%
30.95%
30.68%
12.49%
36.25%
*
**
**
52.88%
29.06%

64.51%

41.3%

48.4%

64.93%

Turnout
2006

2000
37.09%
**
**
**
**
**
**
52.40%
*
53.78%
31.95%
30.81%
**
31.34%
*
**

**

**
**
**
**

18.80%

**

52.5%

53.0%

percent. It is possible that the first election following consolidation was a first-blush effect related
to interest in the new government and voter mobilization generated by the spirited campaign and
districting process. If that were the case, it might be expected that future elections would show
continued decreases in the level of increase in voter participation and ultimately show decreases
in turnout.
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Table 8.10
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors
Time Period
1993-1998

Change
+9.7 percent

1998-2002

+5.5 percent

2002-2006

+3.0 percent

Factors/Notes
Similar trend in overall voting;
popular long-serving mayor
met term limits, new mayor to
be elected
Similar trend in overall voting;
election coincided with federal
election
Up slightly more than overall
increase; may be related to
particular races

As in Nashville and Jacksonville, in terms of the differences in turnout among the black
electoral districts, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently explain
variations. There were some apparent correlations between turnout and income, education
levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure showing the strongest possibilities. However, several
exceptions make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political, such as the
strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

This study examined large-scale metropolitan city-county consolidations in terms of
impact of the government reorganization on black voter participation. The primary hypothesis
was that black voter turnout in local government elections decreases following large-scale
consolidations.

Rationale for the hypothesis was that blacks, concentrated in the central city,

would perceive dilution of their voting power with the addition of suburban residents to the city
voting pool, be discouraged, and therefore not participate.
The hypothesis was tested in three of the four truly large-scale city-county consolidations
(Detailed analysis could not be performed for Indianapolis, though data from an existing study
indicated a rise in black voter participation that mirrored an overall rise in participation; see
APPENDIX B.). Based on the evidence, the data do not support the hypothesis. Table 9.1
outlines the direction of change over the study period in each of the three cities. In only one
case, Jacksonville, did black voter turnout experience a notable and consistent post-consolidation
decrease.

Table 9.1
Summary: Change in Black Voter Turnout and Support of Hypothesis
City

Change, preconsolidation to first
post-consolidation
election

Nashville

Hypothesis
supported?

Increase

Change, first postconsolidation to
second/third postconsolidation
election
Increase

Jacksonville

Decrease

Decrease

Yes

Louisville

Increase

Increase

No
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No

Although the data do not appear to support the hypothesis that city-county consolidation
negatively impacts black voter turnout, the results of this study do not necessarily indicate that
black voters do not perceive a loss of power and change their levels of political participation. A
few points should be considered. First, given quality and availability limitations on maps and
voter turnout records, as well as the fact that Census and electoral boundaries did not always
perfectly coincide, it may be that that data accuracy issues skew actual trends. The types and
quality of data available varied among the cities, and in some cases, from year to year in the
same city, so some approximations were made. Missing or poor quality data and approximations
may have led to errors and inaccuracies or created validity issues. Secondly, decisions in how to
ope rationalize the research may have affected the validity of the study. For example, why choose
only elections in which the mayor's race was included? Did the choice to use the election,
whether primary or general, or run-off, in which the mayor was elected, mask voter behavior in
some way? Finally, comparison of the cities reveals unique circumstances may help explain the
differences in outcomes among the sites.
Nashville was the first of the cities to consolidate. It shared many similarities with
Jacksonville. First, neither had a black elected to municipal office for most of the first half of the
twentieth century, and beyond in the case of the latter. Both cities were reform-minded;
annexation either occurred or was a serious threat in both. Moreover, Jacksonville had
undergone government reorganization in the early 1950s. Nashville had previously attempted
city-county consolidation. Both cities had experienced rapid suburban growth and resulting
infrastructure and service provision shortfalls, as well as eroded tax bases in the city. Corruption
was cited by merger proponents in both cities, though an actual legal case was made in
Jacksonville.
Although Nashville's consolidation occurred prior to national civil rights and voting rights
legislation, the study period includes that era. Jacksonville's consolidation occurred in the height
of awareness of these issues. Indianapolis's consolidation also happened around the same
period, though its situation is unique altogether because the consolidation was not a voter
decision; rather it resulted directly from action, considered highly partisan-based, of the state
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legislature.
As was the case in Nashville, the black community in Jacksonville was somewhat divided
over the consolidation proposal. In Nashville, the two black council members were split among
the two black factions in the community, with Looby a proponent and Lillard against it. Similarly, in
Jacksonville, Sallye Mathis campaigned for the merger, while Mary Singleton was an outspoken
opponent. A key difference between the two cities is that in Jacksonville, the black population
was on the verge of becoming a majority. With blacks gaining political power, perhaps the desire
to maintain newly-acquired power and potential for more immediate representation (even if it
meant a diluted population in the long term) drove blacks to the polls in larger numbers for the
first election.
When compared to Louisville's much later consolidation, Nashville does share a few
similarities in that both stood to potentially lose black representation if the mergers occurred,
though the situation in Louisville was arguably a stronger threat since it was already entirely
single-member district-based and black council representation was proportional to population.
Blacks in Jacksonville felt it to an extent, too, though they had just elected the first blacks in over
five decades months prior to the consolidation; because of "white flight" to the suburbs, blacks
were well on their way to comprising half of the city's population, with the potential to elect more
black representatives and a black mayor. Even in unique Indianapolis, blacks were concerned
about the impending legislative action because the existing system more or less guaranteed one
black council member, and they were becoming a larger proportion of the city's population as
whites relocated to new suburban developments.
Although Louisville did not share the "crisis" type situations experienced by Jacksonville
and Nashville, such as the threat of school disaccreditation or lack of adequate sewer services,
there was concern over the looming expiration of The Compact that provided for revenue sharing
between the City of Louisville and Jefferson County.
With all the similarities, then, why were the trends in black voter turnout so different for
the cities? Turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over time but spiked in 1971. The lack of a
decrease between 1962 and 1966 may have been an artifact of voting rights legislation, though
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comparative analysis of Memphis indicates that it wasn't a strong factor in municipal turnout.
Rather, hot-button issues or individual races may have contributed heavily to the difference. The
jump between 1966 and 1971 levels was probably largely attributable to the strong candidacy of a
segregationist in the mayoral race run-off.
Jacksonville's political climate was especially unique in that over 90 percent of voters
were registered as Democrats, so there were rarely any realistically-contended partisan
races/general elections, especially for mayor. The partisan makeup has tended to remain largelyDemocrat. The real races were in the primaries and run-offs. Also unlike the other cities,
Jacksonville, at over 40 percent black, was on the cusp of becoming majority-black and
experienced the highest level of what amounts to minority vote dilution, whether intentional or not;
the black proportion of the voting pool was cut by more than half with the consolidation.
Louisville's trend is complicated by the change in election cycles. In the last election prior
to consolidation, the municipal election cycle underwent a state-mandated change to coincide
with federal elections years. That arguably led to an increase in turnout across the board, as
turnout for state and local offices has been shown to generally be higher than for municipal
elections.

The largest increase was seen between 1993 and 1998, when that change occurred.

Still, a slight increase occurred again between 1998 and 2002, when the first "metro" election was
held, and again between 2002 and 2006. The trend occurred among all voters as well as among
black voters, suggesting that perhaps the increase was a factor of the state and federal races,
although there could have been some "first blush" effects of consolidation since the 2002 election
was the second to coincide with elections for federal offices.
Although some wide ranges were seen in voter turnout among the black tracts,
preliminary analysis of socioeconomic differences yielded mixed results that were sometimes
contrary to expectations but mostly across the spectrum. In general, levels of educational
attainment, income, and tenure status did not initially appear to explain much of the differences
among the areas.
This study contributes to the literature on city-county consolidations by addressing a littleexamined topic in the field. Equity for minorities, and minority political participation in particular,
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has been one of the major arguments against city-county consolidation, yet few studies have
addressed it beyond enumerating the numbers of black elected officials. Three major sets of
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.
First, students of metropolitan government should take away from the analysis that other
facets of local politics may be much stronger factors than government structure in terms of the
level of voter turnout. A particular "hot button" issue, a scandal, partisan concerns, strength of
candidates, or lack thereof, may draw voters or keep them away from the polls.
Secondly, the problems of data availability should impress upon policymakers that
detailed election results and election geographies should be a priority for preservation in
perpetuity, not disposal after three decades (or only a matter of years in some cases). If physical
storage space is an issue, documents may be scanned and stored electronically, which can also
help prevent loss in case of deterioration of paper versions.
Thirdly, future research might improve upon this study by extending the study periods for
voter turnout by race in consolidated cities. Further analysis could also explore the differences in
turnout among black voting districts by examining the particular races in each district for strength
of races and interest in candidates and/or conducting survey research on electoral participation of
large numbers of individual black voters to be able to conduct rigorous and significant statistical
analysis of the relationships between turnout and socioeconomic and other variables.

Moreover,

more research on voter turnout by race in municipal elections in all types of cities, as opposed to
state and local elections, is needed. Finally, future research should include the exploration of
other equity concerns beyond electoral representation for minorities in consolidated cities, such
as more detailed analysis of the distribution of local resources and services by racial composition
of neighborhoods vis a vis political representation.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNIQUES FOR MATCHING GEOGRAPHY

Most of the maps utilized for this

study~Census

or

electoral~were

not geo-coded to

allow more precise comparison and analysis of the overlapping boundary systems. In some
cases, available electoral district maps were large scale and clearly marked with street
boundaries, which made it relatively easy to compare them to Census tract maps and draw
,

Census boundaries onto the electoral map. This was the case in Jacksonville for all years
studied. In other cases, such as some of the years in Nashville for which only small-scale
electoral maps were available, a lack of detailed municipal boundaries in the electoral maps
made matching them to Census tract geography by "eyeballing" difficult. In those cases, the
smaller-scale electoral maps were scanned. Next, using image manipulation software, the
electoral map was scaled to match the Census tract map and then added to the Census tract
map as an image layer as seen below in Figure A. This type of matching is possible when a
common geographic feature and/or municipal boundaries, such as major roads, are marked in
both maps. In the case of Nashville, the Cumberland River that snakes along an east-west line
just north of downtown, was depicted in both the Census tract map and the metropolitan council
district map.
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Figure A.
Dual-layer Nashville map showing 1970 Census tract boundaries and council districts
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APPENDIX B
INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY

BACKGROUND
BLACK POLITICS AND INDIANAPOLIS GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION
Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Indianapolis and Marion County were
governed by a mayor-council system with a strong mayor and a county commission respectively
(Owen and Willbern 1985). The city generally had a Democrat majority on the nine-member
council.
Council members were elected on an at-large, city-wide basis. Each party could
nominate six candidates for council. Since blacks comprised over a quarter of the population and
could influence election outcomes, both parties typically nominated five white candidates and one
black candidate. Each voter was allowed to cast nine votes. All six candidates from the winning
party were seated, and the top three from the losing party were also seated. With Democrats in
power, it was not uncommon to have one black council member (Pierce 2005).
Unlike prior consolidations in Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County,
and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County merger, Indianapolis and Marion County
consolidated following not a successful public referendum but by an act of the state legislature.
The consolidation was championed by new Republican Mayor Richard Lugar (who later
became a prominent U.S. Senator) and passed by a Republican legislature.
The political setting that ultimately made Unigov's passage possible developed in
two stages. First, the power of the Republican Party in Marion County was
substantially enhanced by the Republican Action Committee's 1966 party
reorganization campaign. This brought a whole company of ambitious and farsighted newcomers into the party and got many of them elected to city, county,
and state offices in the succeeding two years. Mayor Lugar was among them.
The second stage was set when a single party got control of all the key
instruments of government at both state and local levels in 1968 ... [P]erhaps the
most obvious illustration of the partisan impact on the debate was in the General
Assembly. The wholly Republican Marion County delegation was nearly
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unanimous in support, and the large statewide Republican majority assured
passage of the Unigov bills (Owen and Willbern 1985, p.1 01-1 02).
There had been a "widely held perception by the citizenry that local government was
inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive" according to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000, p. 81).
Presumably, this led to the success of Republicans in electing a mayor, Richard Lugar, in 1967,
along with a majority of seats on the city council and several county offices. When Republicans
also dominated elections for state positions in 1968, a virtual mandate was given for change.
Mayor Lugar formed a Task Force on Governmental Reorganization in the spring of
1968. Forty business and civic leaders were named to the task force, but an executive committee
consisting of the city and county council chairmen (both Republicans), Lugar and his deputy
mayor, and four others did the bulk of the work and used the larger group as a "sounding board"
in four meetings. Two meetings were held with the Marion County legislative delegation and a
"blueprint for consolidation" was approved in mid-December (Schreiber, not dated, p.8). Charles
Whistler of the executive committee and a group of lawyers assembled under the direction of
Lugar drafted a 162-page bill for consolidation that was introduced in the Indiana State Senate on
January 21, 1969. The Senate approved an amended bill in February following two public
hearings. The House approved the bill on March 5 and the Senate concurred with technical
amendments. The "Unigov Act" was signed by the governor on March 13.
Some may consider the reorganization a political power grab. In 1969, Marion County
Republican chairman Keith Bulen called it his "greatest coup of all time, moving out there and
taking in 85,000 Republicans" (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 50; also quoted in Schreiber, not
dated). Schreiber (not dated) posits that "Unigov was primarily a political act intended to
perpetuate Republican control of Indianapolis city government" (p. 23).

Representation issues
Black leaders in Indianapolis were generally opposed to consolidation on the grounds
that it would dilute black political power. Although blacks comprised only about a quarter of the
pre-Unigov city population, blacks felt that they had a strong voice and growing power in the
dominant Democratic Party in the city. However, there was never a strong black opposition to the
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Unigov legislation, just as there was never a highly organized campaign in general against
Unigov; only four people from the "black community" spoke against Unigov at legislative public
hearings (Owen and Willbern 1985). Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) note that along with
Democrats, black leaders, and suburbanites failed to create effective opposition.
[A] score of Democratic activists opposed the reorganization out of partisan selfinterest, perceiving that the reorganization of government would provide the
Republicans with a significant advantage in city politics. Second, a number of
African-American political leaders opposed the reorganization proposal,
concerned that it would dilute the political power of their community and
effectively preclude, at least in the short term, the election of an African-American
mayor. And, third, many suburbanites who had recently departed from the city
negatively viewed the plan because it would once again make them city
residents. The strength of these forces opposed to reorganization, however,
dissipated over time, due to internal divisions (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, p.
82).

Frank Lloyd, a well-known black doctor and influential Democrat in the 1960s,
commented that blacks lacked organized leadership in general and were divided on Unigov
(Pierce 2005; Owen & Willbern 1995).

POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION
The bill was passed by the state legislature and signed in March 1969, and the new
consolidated government took effect on January 1, 1970 (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000).
Consolidated Indianapolis-Marion County had a 29-member council, with 25 seats
elected from single-member districts and four members elected at-large. In theory, the new
political structure would give black voters a chance to elect more than one black council member,
as had been the norm under the old system. Pierce (2005, p. 122) notes that the "percentage of
black candidates seated on the county council has increased," though most have been
Democrats on a Republican-dominated council.
In terms of political power and participation, Blomquist and Parks (1995) claim that
What may be Unigov's clearest and longest lasting impact on central-city
residents is that the consolidation solidified Republican party control of city
government, which had been controlled most often by the Democratic party
during the two decades before Unigov. Politically, the Republican-dominated
county took over the marginally Democratic city (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p.
50).
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Blomquist and Parks (1995) find that the first two elections following Unigov saw increased voter
turnout in general but that participation began decreasing considerably thereafter. Participation in
local elections had climbed from a low of 41.1 percent in 1959 to 45.2 percent in 1967, when
Lugar was elected, then grew to 53.8 percent in 1971. It remained fairly steady in 1975 at 52.4
percent, but had fallen to 33.6 percent just four years later in 1979. Blomquist and Parks attribute
the drop-off to the "message that Democrats could not win under Unigov" that was conveyed in
1975 when Democratic candidate Robert Welch lost to Republican William Hudnut despite
carrying the pre-consolidation city.
Turnout in the 1979 municipal elections, and in all municipal elections since,
indicates that central-city Democratic voters have adjusted their behavior
accordingly. In 1979, 60,000 fewer Marion County residents voted in the mayor's
race than had done so in 1975. Yet Hudnut's 1979 vote total was almost
identical to that of 1975. In other words, between 1975 and 1979, 60,000
potential Democratic votes disappeared from Indianapolis'[s] municipal
elections ... Most of that loss occurred in the precincts of the old central city.
These voters did not leave the city, nor did many of them leave the voter
registration rolls. Most of them continued to vote in state and national elections.
(Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 52).

BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION DATA & ANALYSIS
Data and availability issues
The new metropolitan government took effect in 1970, with the first election for
metropolitan officials taking place in November 1971. For consideration in this study, mayoral
elections relatively immediately prior to and following the consolidation approval were held in
Indianapolis in 1963, 1967, 1971, and 1975.
In 1960, 19 Census tracts in Indianapolis were greater than 50 percent black. Of these,
14 tracts had a black population above 70 percent. There were 35 Census tracts that were over
50 percent black in 1970, 27 of which had a black population over 70 percent.
Although there were no Census tract geographic boundary changes between the 1960
and 1970 Census, the population demographics within the tracts and Marion County appear to
have changed considerably. All but one of the 1960 majority black tracts were located within the
Center Township, which was also the location of all but three of the 1970 majority black tracts.
Center Township, representing the city center and central business district areas and the bulk of
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the pre-consolidation Indianapolis boundary, experienced a large overall population decline
between 1960 and 1970 of nearly 18 percent, losing nearly 60,000 people in a drop from 333,351
to 273,596. Simultaneously, the black population in Center Township increased by over 18.6
percent, from 89,439 to 106,124, a gain of 16,685 blacks. Together, these two trends brought the
black population portion of the central city from 26.83 percent to 38.79 percent.

19

Stickles (1973) studied black voter participation in the pre-consolidation Indianapolis city
in six elections between 1966 and 1972, including the mayoral elections in 1967 and 1971.
Grouping precincts into Black (75 percent or greater black), Mixed (25-74 percent black), or White
(0-24 percent black), Stickles found that voter participation increased for all categories between
1967 and 1971 (pre- and post-consolidation). Turnout in "black" precincts increased by 10
percentage points, from 45.47 to 55.66 percent. Participation in "white" precincts increased by 12
percent, from 52.46 to 64.57 percent. Differences between the races were much smaller when
socioeconomic status in terms of income group and education level was controlled (Stickles
1973).
Although turnout increased for both racial groups, it should be noted that not only did the
white turnout percentage increase by more than the black turnout, but the gap between white and
black turnout increased from about seven percent to about nine percent.
Unfortunately, complete precinct level data on registration, turnout, and precinct maps
that Stickles obtai Red from the "city-county building in Indianapolis" are no longer available from
local or state government sources. An exhaustive effort was made to locate data and maps, with
government offices, university sources, newspaper archives, and other sources consulted. The
Marion County Election Commission did not house detailed municipal election data prior to the
1980s. The Indiana State Board of Elections and Indiana State Library held only county level
figures. Some historical precinct level results were available at the Indiana State Archives,
though not for municipal elections. The Indianapolis Star newspaper reported precinct level
results for some years, by ward only for others, and summaries by race for at least one other.

19 Calculations based on data reported in: Department of Metropolitan Development Division of Planning
(1984, August). A decennial statistical profile of Indianapolis-Marion County: 1960, 1970, 1980.
Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana.

128

Precinct maps from 1980, but not prior, were also available at the Indiana State Archives. None
of the government election data sources had any precinct maps from the 1960s or 1970s. Stan
Huseland, an Indianapolis Star reporter in the consolidation era and author of a book on
Republican boss Keith Bulen, recommended checking with the Indianapolis Historical Society and
the archives at University of Indianapolis, where Bulen and Lugar archives are held (Huseland
interview, October 27,2008). Those sources did not have the missing data or maps available. A
large collection of Indianapolis government data donated to the historical society by historian
George Geib was unavailable to the public at the time of request. Material was also unavailable
from the Marion County Democratic and Republican parties. Bredensteiner Imaging, a local print
shop in downtown Indianapolis, has large-scale 1971 and 1975 precinct maps, though they are
mounted on retractable, pull-down rolls and can only be reproduced without damage by
photograph.
The lack of available data would require alternative sources and measures to be
employed for analysis of black voter turnout over the 1963-1975 period. In theory, city wards
could be used as an approximation. Prior to consolidation, the city of Indianapolis consisted of 32
wards, each containing multiple precincts. Election registration and turnout data in Marion
County continued to be reported by wards following consolidation, at least for the study years.
Indianapolis Star newspaper archives report turnout by ward, and sometimes precinct, for some
of the mayoral elections prior to and following consolidation. Since precinct maps are unavailable
for the purposes of this study, wards are the smallest municipal geographic area that may be
matched to census tracts for voting turnout analysis. However, the wards are larger than census
tracts, each containing multiple tracts. Moreover, many of the tracts are split between wards.
These two complications together, make any further meaningful analysis of black voter turnout in
Indianapolis nearly impossible.
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